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SEA Analysis Report		Air Operations					
VC/NVA		Deployments					
Pacification		Logistics/Construction					
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This twelve volume set includes every article printed in the fifty issue series of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report. The SEA Analysis Report represented a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NV operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, war costs and inflation and construction and pert operations in South Vietnam.

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CONSTRUCTION AND PORT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

VOLUME 12

Plant rept.,

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

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### A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM MAR: 1965-1972

### Contents of the 12 Volumes

Volume 1 - The Situation In Southeast Asia

Volume 2 - Forces and Manpower

Volume 3 - Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations

Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Haval Operations

Volume 5 - The Air War

Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

Volume 8 - Casualties and Losses

Volume 9 - Population Security

Volume 10 - Pacification and Civil Affairs

Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation

Volume 12 - Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

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# A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam Mar: 1985-1972

# VOLUME 12

# CONSTRUCTION AND PORT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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A Systems Analysis View Of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

### INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Scutheast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such at the Paris Delegation, ATD, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Ambassador has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication." (State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1962)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this neadquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)."
(MAJV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information	42%
Analysis	31%
Policy Making	11点
Briefings	7%
Other	_ 9%_
	1002

In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/HVA	18%
Air Operations	20%
RVNAF	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	100%

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer February 18, 1975

### SFA CONSTRUCTION

### Program Surmary

The military construction program in support of SEA operations is cut intly funded (through FY-66S) at \$1,728.2 million. (See Table 1). As of December 31, 1966, the Military services reported that \$1,616.0 million had been released to the field. The current cost estimate of the projects under way with those funds is \$1,782.8 million, and the dollar value of the construction completed (i.e., Work-In-Place, or W-I-P) is \$567.8 million, indicating a 37.5 percent completion based on current cost estimates.

### Progreys Reporting

Table 2 shows progress on the MILCON program by month and by country. table starts in March 1965 with data from the first monthly Construction Progress Report (DD-6610). "Work-Planned" is the forecast of the m-1-P to be completed in next month. A comparison of the Work-Planned and Work-Actual entries for a given month indicates the success of the construction units, contractors and troops (in SVN and Thailand), in meeting their monthly estimate. Table 3 shows progress and planning at selected bases and ports. These data also come from the DD-6610 report.

### Program/Budget Decisions

The December decisions for the FY 1967 Supplemental and FY 1968 MILCON program budget are summarized on the right side of Table 1. Included in the 67S figures is \$126.4 million to cover the unfunded part of the RMX-BRJ contract overrun in SVN. Including \$77 million provided from the FY 66S, the total overrun funding will be \$203.4 million. However, data in the NAVFEC Construction Status Report of January 1, 1967 shows that the difference between current cost estimate and funding is \$231.5 million. OASD(I&L) states any increase in cost over programmed funds must be absorbed by the necessary scope reductions.

#### Jet Airbase Pavements Analysis

An analysis of the programmed airfield pavements at the eight jet-capable bases in South Vietnam was conducted to determine if the pavements (runways, taxiways, and operational aprons) will be adequate to support approved Program #4 aircraft deployments. Planned base loadings for all types aircraft were considered at Eien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phan Rang, Phu Cat, Tan Son Nhut, and Tuy Hoa. Pavement assets considered were those originally available plus MAP and MILCON projects funded through FY-68. The time frame was December 1968, when all programmed pavement should be completed.

The analysis concluded that:

1. Runways programmed at the eight jet bases will support sustains. Program #4 operations. This table summarizes the major characteristics of these fields:

47

### Airfield

### Runways

	Length(Ft)	Iyoe	Operational Date
Bien Hoa	10,000	Concrete Concrete	Completed May 1968
Cam Ranh Bay	10,000 10,000	Concrete AM-2	May 1967 Completed
Chu Lai	20,000 <u>e/</u> 8 000 <u>e/</u> 4,000 <u>e/</u> b/	Concrete AM-2 AM-2	Completed Completed Completed
Da Nang	10,000	Asphalt Concrete	Existed Completed
Phan Rang	10,000	Concrete AM-2	Completed
Phu Cat	10,000	Concrete	April 1967
Tan Son Nhut	10,300 10,000 7,800 b/	Concrete Concrete Asphalt	Existed June 1957 Existed
Tuy lica	10,000 9,000	Concrete AM-2	June 1967 Completed

a/ USMC Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS). b/ Crosswind.

At Cam Ranh Ray, Chu Lai, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa, where the secondary runways are Mi-2 expeditionary matting, continued close attention must be paid to maintaining them for backup use, especially during the rainy periods.

- 2. Sufficient tamiways, holding and warmup aprons, and wash racks will be provided at all bases to meet Program #4 aircraft and operational needs.
- 3. In operational agron, Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa will have surpluses, which should be considered for reprogramming. At Bien Hoa, Da Rang, Phu Cat, and Tan Son Whut there will be significant deficiencies, some of which could be met by reprogramming. At Tan Son Whut this would not help because of the lack, of real estate. However, crowded parking could be reduced there by redeploying units to other bases. The details by base are shown on the following Table.

# OPERATIONAL APRONS (SQ YDS)

Base	Required	· Programmed	Deficiency	Surplus a/
Bien Hoa	618,000	576,566	41,434	
Cam Ranh Bay	443,000	545,530	•	102,530
Chu Lai	260,000	390,377		130,377
Da Nang	595,000	512,640	82,360	•
Phan Rang	254,000	295,980	•	41,980
Phu Cat	240,000	133,600	106,400	•
Tan Son Nhut	965,600	544,497	421,103	
Tuy Hoa	155,000	165,833		10,833

a/ OASD(I&L) states that this apparent surplus may represent pavement programmed for other than aircraft parking, and that this aspect must be explored further.

By considering the aggregated jet bases only, there is a sizeable deficiency (365,577 SY) in total operational apron. This could pose a serious problem in case one or more fields was closed for an extended time due to enemy action or other emergency. In those cases, redeployments would have to be made, and non-jet aircraft might have to be sent to other than jet bases.

This SA/SEA Programs Division analysis is available in that office to interested parties.

# SOUTHFAST ASIA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING STANDARY (\$ millions)

•	FY-65 MCP	FY-65 Supp		FY-66 Awend	FY 66 Supp	MAP Transfer
**************************************	PL 88-390	PL 89-18	PI, 89-188	PL 89-213	PL 89-374	PL 89-37.
ARMY South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	15.5 15.5 0 0	36.1 8.7 0	29.6 29.6 0 0	64.6 35.9 12.7 7.0 9.0	591.5 358.5 47.3 123.3 62.4	63.0 0
NAVY South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	14.5 9.4 0 0 5.1	22.0 17.4. 0 0 4.6	39.8 30.3 0 9.5	43.2 32.9 0 0.3	275.9 177.6 / 16.3 25.4 56.6	10.6 Q -
AIR FORCE South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	23.1 11.2 8.9 0.5 2.5	41.0 21.4 11.9 0 7.7	13.5 0 0 0	57.9 39.2 14.2 0 4.5	335.3 148.45/ 97.1 5.0 84.8	27.1 0 er en
TOTAL South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	53.1 36.1 8.9 0.5 7.6	107.8 74.9 20.6 0 12.3	82.9 73.4 0 0 9.5	165.7 108.0 26.9 7.3 23.5	1,202.7 684.5 160.7 153.7 203.8	105.7 0

Includes transfers of \$168.5 million from DOD Contingency Fund to Services. Includes \$2.5 million for RVNAF facilities.

United States and Other.
Includes \$6.95 million for NIKE-X TACMAR Building on Kwajalein.

Includes for PRACTICE NINE: Army, \$3.3 mil.in USAir Force, \$6.0 million in SVN and \$4.0 million in Plus \$200 million DOD World-wide Contingency Fund.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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-	FY-65 PL 88-		FY-65 PL 89-		FY-66 PL 89		FY-66 A PL 89-2	
ARMY South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	15.5 0 0	15.5	36.1 6.7 0	44.8	29.6 0 0	29.6	35.9 12.7 7.0 9.0	
NAVY South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	9.4 0 0 5.1;	14.5	17.4 0 0 1.6	22.0	30.3 0 0 9.5	,;;39 <b>.</b> 8	32.9 0 0.3 10.0	43:
AIR FORCE South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	11.2 8.9 0.5 2.5	23.1	21.4 ; 11.9 0 7.7	41.0	13.5 0 0	13.5	39.2 14.2 0 4.5	57
TOTAL South Vietnam Thailand United States Other	36.1 8.9 0.5 7.6	53.1	74.9 20.6 0 12.3	107.8	73. <sup>1</sup> 4 0 0 9.5	82.9	108.0 26.9 7.3 23.5	165.

Includes transfers of \$168.5 million from DOD Contingency Fund to \$
Includes \$2.5 million for RVNAF facilities.

United States and Other.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Includes \$6.95 million for NIKE-X TACMAR Building on Kwajalein.
Includes for PRACTICE NINE: Army, \$0.3 mil.in US; Air Force, \$6.0 million DOD World-wide Contingency Fund.

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	148.45) 97.1 5.0 84.8	335.3	27.1 0 -	27.1	266.8e/ 136.1e/ .5.5 .99.5	507.9	207.2 144.9 48.3 <u>-</u>		103.5 69.3 3.4 19.8	196.0	24.2 9.8 0 1.0	35.0	
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OASD/SA/SEA Programs Division February 1, 1967

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1.	Courses  South License  8. Fregres Antient (a)  b. Current With an intenses		<u> Farsh</u>	Ap:11	307	2 15.0	<u>:=1;</u>
1.	s. Prigry April (1)		278,900	933,752	8(2.73)	632,979	437,477
	b. Cierent Struck intimate e. Physical Corplet?		122.166	5.3.172		35° . 154 1' '55	415.3
	e. Physical Complets of		1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1	60,6-1	3 .10	1, 20	33.7
	d. Work - Flann-t		(4)	19, 141 20,625			23.27
	e. kark - Astual		**	50/414	22.306	£0,768	37.543
2.	Thattan		161,607	216,663	220.5	937.775	223, 721
	a. Progres Impact Finish (b) b. Current withing totamate		362,445	317.744	Mc.es	227.676	213.217
	c. Physical Completica		15,595	317,746 17,252	17	227.076 227.070 34,60	203,721 213,217 39,603
	d. Work - Flannet		(6)	2.163	1.113	3,123	1:3
	e. Kork - Actual		2,525	1,152	10,55 25,657 10,653 10,055	2,741	5.53
	Zhilippines						ŧ
	a. Prigram Amount Publish (1)		13,730	62,751 61,56- 6.33;	69,:53	72,2-7	72,587
	b. Current Working Estimate		<b>€</b> 2,€30	61,56-	70.235	73,539	يشر * دلا
	- Santiani Araniania		3.594	€,337	9,37	11,142	13,323
	4. Work - Planned		(a)	3,313	£,523	1, x.3 641	5,630
	4. Work - Planned e- Work - Actual		150	2,275	7.55	<i>y.</i> 641	72,187 77,707 11,123 2,630 2,634
	0.43		6	** ***			
	6. Program Amount Pinted (t)		10,246	15,94	16.92\$	15,955 16,052 1,163	16,7-2 15,05
	b. Current Worston Estimate		10,153	15.633	15,775	14,052	19,5%
	e. Invescel Completion		10,153 1,655	2.3	1,633	4,463	6.17-
	4. Work - Flanted e. Work - Actual	7.	(4)	1,124	1,013	240 8,529	1,62
	e. Work - Actual		258	1,172	1,071	4,729	1026
	Ckinws		20 637	60 619	70,637	67,687	67,63
•	a. Progres Assent Pantet (b)		32,537	8, 7, 4	23,979	50.395	93.05
	b. Carrent borking fatinate		32,986 1,650	0.63	21.5	1,103	4,575
	c. Fayerest Captering d. Work - Flanned		(e)	69,512 84,715 2,636	3,175 1,33	670	717~6
	e. Work - Actual		321	705	1,574	793	23
	Teiwan						
	a. Progres Assust Futiti (b)		27,513 23,149 3,392	23.339	25,455 25,455	21,755 23,862	24,719
	b. Current Working Istimate		23,149	24,0:-	25,445	23,562	3-,-2
	e. Physical Completion		1.392	2.25	2.20	3,245	ڎؚ <i>ڿ</i> ڹؙڔؙؽ
	4. Work - Flanned		(8)	165 165	29	2	
	e. Work - Astual		250	165	41	967	2,153
	IRM					al 200a	13 54-
	Progres Assunt Funded (2)		3,199	18,273 18,341 14,2	14,530 23,083 486	14,850	14.550 15.452
	5 Correct Working Extinate		2'433	10,3-1	23,003	23.695	72.000
	e. Physical Completion		3,135 303 (e)	2	-00	675 116	970
	d. Work - Flannet		(4)	<b>5</b> 4	33	189	්ඩ රෝ
	e. Work - Actual		-	134		247	- 641
•	Milbray  6. Program Amount Finish (b)		2556	2,200	2,100	3,200	2,100
	b. Carrect Working Estimate		2017	2,100	2,100	2,107	12,513
	e. Physical Completion		•	Ö	0	8	F 6
	4. Work - Planati			Ŏ	Ó	21	12.00
	e. Work - Actual			Ó	٥	٥	
	Yeke						
	8. Progress Annual Funtet (b)		1,010	1,010	1,074	1,074	1.07
	b. Current Working Tatimate		3,010	1,010	3,249	1,164	1,47
	e. Physical Completion			Ö	ç	0	
	d. Work - Flannet e. Work - Art.al		(a)	0	0	0	č
			•	•	•	•	•
•	United States (Irolates Cabe & 1 a. Fragris Amount Faces (b)	Puerso Blee)	19,675	ed. est.	×.712	153,019	153,000
	b. Correct Winding Indicate		19,39	GA	25.334	110,024	151.42+
	e. Mysical Completion		10,027	94,594 94,431 11,155	13,112	19,206	27.172
	4. Work - Flyret		(a)	935	1.7	2,42?	3,112
	e. Work - Actual		1,3/4	1,234		2,42? 6,312	1.81-
ÇĄ.	en et herten. Mis die for di	etts .					
	a. Progres & an lates (c)		578,077	1,339,174	1,350,318	1,33,44	1.5%1
	be Present Alertic anticate		613,227	1,445.53.	1, . ! \$ . " ! 1		1.714.
			FLT 333	1117544	164.44	122,751	23:4
	e. Prostrut Corner a		~,,,,,,,			60 000	7.4
	e. Physical Copyet. n d. Work - Flance: e. Work - Attual		80,311 (a) FA	111753 25,555 35,555	45,146 41,503	19,9€9 10,9€0	2.42

on a bole set of the first sparen states in North 1966, at (a) and a south return sparen states in North 1966, at (b) a fact of the control front in a still state in the latter of the cultion of sparents.

(a) a fact of the control front in the control for the latter of the cultion of sparents.

(b) a fact of the cultion of the cultio

STATEMENT AND REAL PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PERSON OF THE PERSON

TAKE 3

				ce	HFIDEHT	IAL					1957
I. STITE (TIME)  Rese (Avertice) with estimates  cost over (15 million	CI-Life	6 <del>A<u>r</u>11</del>	Yey	Juna	July	Augest	September	October	Rownber	December	Jana .
Figure Figure 1 move (c)  5. Program Annual Figure (c)  5. Common Version Serimate  6. Proposed Completion in 1  6. Word - Flanced  6. Word - Fundal  6. Scheduled BCD (Airfield Pevenents)  6. Scheduled BCD (Airfield Pevenents)	5,232 7,577 1,553 (k) 32 37,5	5,913 5,516 2,353 6:6 7:1	11,192 2,333 743 743 11,192	15,016 20,132 2,245 541 115 62,7	18,689 32,443 5,311 541 2,464 02,7	15,751 12,721 5,613 602 012	18,961 12,724 6,283 524 413 62,7	15,569 33,140 6,258 943 308 04,7	32,649 7 237	15,225 31,-29 8,104 395 625 04,7	1,214
Can Fach Say (Army)  a. Proprin Armet Paries (b)  b. Oursent Wraving Estimate  c. Paries Competion in S  d. bork - Plannet  e. Work - Putual  f. Schedulet EDD (Fort Facilities) #	29,118 31,595 2,527 (e)	60,591 61,126 3,157 952 759	69,804 72,730 7,013 1,417 -,067 278	75,952 73,503 12,637 3,9-0 5,6'.1 173	76,740 74,260 14,022 6,595 2,469 07,7	69,103 54,934 14,03 3,315 2,159 07,7	79,929 81,072 19,131 5,433 4,368 07,7	81,549	3,161 7,31	80,524 85,031 25,478 3,746 4,933 03,7	3)756
Con Fach Ray(News)  a. Propert Assumt Funded (b)  b. Ourrest Working Dittinate  c. Physical Completion in S  d. Work - Planned  e. Work - Astual  f. Scheduled 300 (Fore Facilities) 2/	L,CCC 3,772 (a) 0	15,047 14,59/ 0 0 0	15,143 24,897 0.00 0.00	15,1-5 14,920 469 159	15,190 19,576 959 0 875	15,770 22,699 2,475 400 2,009 g/8.	13,521 19,633 3,143 3,017 665 -65,6	16,793 28,012 4,293 3,023 1,274 05,6	5,00	17,330 20,379 4,521 1,262 0	1,036
Can punh Sar(Air Force)  6. Proprin Annun Furdas (b)  8. Current Working Envirance  9. Poyatisel Completion in \$  6. Work - Element  8. Work - Annul  6. Scheduled Edd (Airfield Pavements) 3/	25,340 35,530 7,533 (a) 05,7	21,071 21,071 7,212 955 664 05,7	23,21.5 25,762 9,757 550 1,693 01,7	12,513 42,501 11,535 630 1,817 01,7	47,607 49,065 14,611 606 1,840 01,7	42,506 49,065 17,564 755 6 2,753 01,7	\$2,156 \$3,\$15 15,761 1,365 1,205 01,7	62,901	51,451 66,890 28,379 1,099 3,178 64,7	51,456 62,756 31,731 1,009 5,179 05,7	2,363
B. Fright Amount Finced (t)  B. Current Working Esticate  C. Physical Completion in \$  d. Work - Flance!  E. Work - Actual  F. Scheduled BOD (Airfield Personne)	27,330 31,219 2,430 (a) 32 09,6	34,265 35,226 5,733 622 2,864 10,6	57,569 62,113 7,379 3,517 2,166	62,991 62,513 7,316 3,26 1,624	64,132 66,552 11,536 3,093 3,173	6-,132 65,671 12,55- 2,55- 2,653 63,7	70,705 71,082 19,303 3,635 6,733 03,7	74,998 75,765 23,023 4,114 4,258 03,7	74,607 75,437 30,537 5,385 8,065 03,7	74,003 75,309 34,335 2,130 63,7	5,323
Delics (tary)  a. Program Ansum Puntes (b)  b. Current Moreing Estimate  c. Physical Curpletion in 3  d. Work - Flammes  e. Work - Actual	36,507 37,168 7,269 (a) 23	34,705 35,355 5,524 3,014 733	69,766 67,151 6,513 3,662 3,176	71,3-1 72,393 10,3% 6,527 2,413	69,352 71,157 15,725 2,549 6,789	69,682 69,622 16,772 3,504 4,333	68,146 69,242 21,425 7,971 4,163	61,733 69,367 25,333 3,215 4,019 03,7	69,375 30,559 5,639	114,073 149,552 72,149 5,107 10,230 64,7	13,023
a. Program Anount Pended (b) c. Oursent Working Intimate c. Physical Completion in S d. Work - Planned e. Work - Archul f. Sobeduled BOO (Port Fanishies)	17,323 21,544 5,010 23,64 23,6	25,982 27,431 10,351 1,555 4,613	19,303 19,551 12,667 3,735 2,507	19,191 14,221 2,777 14,221 253	62,726 70,131 20,023 3,480 5,5:2	63,176 63,175 23,757 3,731 6,537	69,319 68,727 29,592 5,953 7,605 10,6	7,512 03,7	76,017 82,407 84,670 7,018 5,626 05,7	(Cushined a Da Hang abuve) 5,066	กษุ้
Eone Binh (Army)  a. Frohan Amount Puntet (b)  b. Current Working Estimate  e. Physical Completion in \$  d. Work - Flammes  e. Work - Artmal  f. Schedulet SCO (Atmin. Bidgs.)	1,05 1,05 59 (a) 23 6-,6	2,350 2,350 1,003 257 1,50 257 25,6	15,574 18,924 1,153 151 76 06,6	18,82: 18,22: 1,25! 45: 45: 66,6	27,35; 27,979 1,976 550 550 542 66,7	\$0.716 \$1.734 2,679 545 563 66,7	50,716 50,549 3,157 1,223 276 03,7	96,062 126,423 16,397 3,527 5,386 93,7	96,607 137,269 18,823 3,673 2,426 03,7	\$3,527 £/ 94,771 12,355 5,931 4,334 03,7	2,32-
Mi: Not applicable Mi: Not reported (a) No, since report system started in March 1999. (b) Pauls received at Sield Land from allocations rate (c) Fancel unless Notation, NT-65 MILECTO Persons II le-								•			

(c) There was no server as the large street market from my the markety opportunities. The server profession from the 1 limbs, 77-65 MM CUPP: PL 59-109, R-66 FL 51-0713, NT-66 MM Arent 27 59-109, FF-07 MM CUPP: Affect MM CUPP: PL 59-109, R-66 FL 51-0713, NT-66 MM Arent 27 59-109, FF-07 MM CUPP: Affect MM CUPP: PL 59-109, R-66 MM CUPP: PL 51-109, NT-66 MM

(e) Evag bith complex incl.les in 1970 formerly reported at hien Ros.
(f) Dear not declare hien Yea. (for focused es. Direction of S year intervals:
Declaration of S year intervals:
Declaration of the 12 years.
DEC Direction 12 \$935.55: 10-6510 Perort

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CABIE 3

		CS-1366					CC.		2145			
		March	<u> </u>	l'ay	June .	Culy	Augus	Espoyabes	· Catober	November	December	196 <u>Ja</u> rua
	Then many (Air Firse)  a. Program Arthur Funder (b)  b. Current Proking Estimate  c. Physical Cupiculan in \$  d. Work - Planted  c. Work - Actual  f. Scheduled 500 (Airfield Pavements)  Des Cott (Air Firse)	12,810 23,215 312 (a) NR 07,7	27,778 22,978 530 721 302 178	27,043 27,-99 2,3-0 -90 1,202 753	25,793 25,055 3,613 770 1,273 03,7	26,253 33,657 5,678 790 2,065 03,7	26,187 33,691 7,632 1,055 2,15- 03,7	25,187 33,691 10,779 1,160 2,947 03,7	25,727 35,422 12,095 1,606 2,759 C4,7	31,425 35,555 17,374 2,630 5,100 04,7	31,425 33,690 13,957 1,462 6,555	1,578
	A. Frogram Front Funded (b) b. Current Working Estimate c. Physical Campination in \$ d. Work - Planned c. Work - Artual f. Sobeduled BID (Airfield Favoments)	5,263 5,265 (a) <sup>0</sup>	5,7-5 5,7-5 0 0 0-,7	11,127 11,127 0 0 0-,7	11,145 11,050 33 10 33 03,7	21,374 37,626 317 50 264 03,7	21,309 37,616 551 500 23,	21,309 37,626 1,646 200 4,691 03,7	27,849 23,060 6,784 2,903 4,625 03,7	27,049 28,642 10,009 5,250 2,525 03,7	27,519 30,575 10,788 4,036 2,545 03,7	2,635
	Pleiby (Army)  a. Program about Funded (b)  b. Gurrent Working Estimate  c. Physical Outpletion in \$  d. Work - Flauned  e. Work - Actual  f. Schedulad bill (Canterments)  gai then (Army)  a. Program Amount funded (b)  b. Current Working Estimate  c. Physical Completion in \$  d. Work - Flauned  e. Work - Actual  f. Schedulad 3DD (Port Familities)  Season (Army)	nyc	21396 21396 51396 51397	12,25? 12,253 2-5 291 18-	12,566 12,566 165 374 219	12,766 13,063 250 351 216	17,202 17,766 672 377 195 177	17,525 16,905 2,468 759 -,796 03,7	20,353 29,218 3,829 862 1,465 03,7	20,501 28,329 4,129 957 300 93,7	21,209 23,911 23,977 036 521 03,7	; 635
	on mon terms  a. Program Amount junied (b)  b. Current Vorking Estimate  c. Prysical Completion in \$  d. Work - Flanced  e. Work - Actual  f. Scheduled 300 (Port Facilities)	7,005 7,005 (a)	25,315 29,313 2,832 0 811 01,7	30,979 31,082 3,095 525 183 01,7	21,360 31,441 3,693 1,137 623 01,7,	31,353 29,735 3,239 1,056 8-2 01,7	46,991 43,731 7,279 764 3,615 01,7	47,219 45,124 6,199 5,325 - 920 01,7	39,351 49,710 12,64. 4,553 2,398 01,7	39,624 19,723 12,975 3,795 1,409 01,7	39,3% 47,507 17,253 4,097 4,744 01,7	3,046
ر م	Seicon (Army) Program Abount Pundei (b) Current Working Estimate Physical Completion in \$ Work - Planuei e. Work - Actual f. Schedulei EDD (Port Facilities)	17,616 19,526 1,475 (a) 33 11,6	19,266 26,711 2,405 1,931 2,217 69,6	16,163 51,016 5,609 1,198 1,759 12,7	16,693 54,335 5,335 5,335 2,801 12,7	52,772 57,683 12,057 2,517 2,971 12,7	53,522 59,149 11,720 2,199 2,521 12,7	55,296 62,036 15,243 4,133 3,523 02,7	93,246 101,140 18,642 6,399 4,510 c2,7	94,531 76,864 20,653 9,332 2,611 02,7	65,518 70,500 21,003 9,276 2,059 02,7	1,714
	Tan Son Must (its Torre)  a. Program Amount Finish (b)  b. Current Working Estimate  c. Physical Completion in \$  d. Work - Flannel  e. Work - Astual  f. Scheduled E00 (Airfield Pavements)	13,031 15,733 1,922 (a) KA EF3	16,055 16,055 3,673 1,632 1,542	20,566 20,703 -,601 1,155 1,635 6-,7	22,052 23,154 6,851 1,030 1,530 04,7	22,361 34,520 6,632 1,142 2,546 24,7	22,361 31,211 9,955 1,719 1,353	22,361 34,241 10,553 1,557 568 04,7	14,358 34,948 20,039 2,071 314 04,7	19,354 35,048	19,354 35,012 11,014 1,339 175 06,7	2,446
	Tuy Nos (Air Force) a. Program Atturt Funded (b) b. Current Working Estimate c. Physical Implation in \$ 4. Work - Planned e. Work - Estual f. Scheduled ROD (Airfield Pavements)				25,300	25,343 25,343	10.3L3	ko, 343 51. 955	40,343	40,343 51,965 10,947 3,000 7,228 05,7	52,5k3 52,043 17,540 6,600 6,633 05,7	NR E
	Vung Tau (trmy)  a. Program Amount Funded (b)  b. Current Working Estimate  c. Physical Completion in \$  d. Work - Flanced  e. Work - Actual  f. Scheduled 200 (Cuntomments)	5,711 5,703 31-5 (a) 28 28	10,213 10,2-6 111	14,881 16,356 747	14,891 16,332 1,153 1,314 14,6	14,831 16,332 1,854 1,031 727 06,7	15,711 17,152 1,889 1,278 123 06,7	15,711 17,663 2,077 1,053 158 06,7	17,698 23,601 7,079 1,047 1,402 06,1	15,961 23,540 7,200 915 260 06,7	19,861 20,752 6,406 2,407 1,216 00,7	2,721
3/2	NILLE MARE (Service) with estimated cost											
	over \$10 million  Sattehip (Army)  a. Program Armynt Funded (b)  b. Current Work.and Estimate  c. Physical Counterion in \$  d. Work - Platani  e. Work - Armai  f. Scheduled 501 (Port Familities)  1/	06 .03 (a) .23	69,223 190 0	271,751	19,175 756 35	11,015 24	335	19,975 22,377 5,991 77 2,653	#;,317 6,554 1.765	8,608 85,903	52,917 23,434 5,534 5,57 105 12,7	23
)	Settahip (New)  a. Program An and Funded (b)  b. Current Almaine Futirate  c. Physical Lupication in \$  d. Work - Finance  c. Work - Arneal  f. Scheduled Bult (Port Facilities)  4/	m	16,500 16,500 54 30,7	21,300 206 206 21,7	3/10	0	, ,		16,839 55	201	16,300 13,566 1,357 1,348 57,7	1,550
	53 CONFIDENTIAL			€⊅. The	11-6610	Report	COSSES	retrus	Vork Proj To 13, 1, Tage 2	ereca Div. Tr 3		Æ

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	08-196	5			CONFIG	ENTIAL			•		
		April	May	June	July	Appeat	Septences	r October	Kovether	December	j 1967 Jenuary
⁄4ر.	62,119 64,135 1,022 (a) 64,1 03,7	52,728	\$7,755 52,643 13,241 2,660 6,764 04,7	46,636 51,534 16,545 504 1,590 04,7	46,696 54,519 17,996 2,556 10,6	46,636 65,513 20,040 132 2,272 11,6	51,201 65,103 23,031 181 4,019 02,7	54,894 (2,356 22,984 88 542 02,7	54,694 70,351 27,251 NR 4,614 02,7	54,834 71,142 33,939 MR 7,167 62,7	SR
y'	16,977 15,974 2,273 (a) NR 12,6	38,673 57,576 3,991 1,800 1,718 09,7	39,778 39,267 6,710 2,821 2,410	39,945 5,959 2,358	38,619 39,615 7,220 2,211 1,301 09,7	35,414 39,271 8,008 2,519 788 99,7	37,919 35,620 8,674 3,470 1,149 09,7	38,404 35,366 8,945 4,133 71 69,7	37,919 39,974 13,015 3,465 4,069 03,8	38,404 37,978 13,435 4,962 512 - 03,8	3, <i>9</i> /2
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-Aliper-treasure	•				-				ş		
St. Acquery da pred November en	17,835 18,304 1,670 (a) 184 MFS	19,293 19,941 2,187 257 412 64,7	19,907 20,706 2,753 341 482 94,7	24,057 23,513 3,000 295 345 04,7	24,057 23,978 3,237 106 114 08,7	27,090 3,300 145 106	24,057 24,057 3,596 -130 -205	24,057 24,038 3,899 205 303 08,7	24,057 23,062 3,992 139 183 08,7	24,057 23,365 3,530 2,167 471 03,7	2,342
es)#/	Mc	17,233 16,465 220 0 158 10,7	17,511 16,537 491 114 271 10,7	15,161 15,379 624 205 334 10,7	19,343 21,753 1,311 156 487 10,7	17,843 18,480 1,922 437 611 10,7	18,063 18,912 2,952 1,321 1,030 04,8	17,982 19,718 4,278 830 1,327 04,8	17,944 19,653 5,239 1,166 951 04,8	18,001 19,073 6,249 805 1,009 05,8	500
ne i kalifikana kukukukukuki dal	9,590 9,607 1,855 (a) 903 02,7	9,590 9,378 2,850 1,085 1,048 02,7	10,572 10,715 3,902 976 1,067 02,7	10,572 10,321 4,267 175 2,161 02,7	10,572 10,325 5,203 1,295 858 03,7	10,572 10,643 6,052 1,066 659 03,7	10,572 10,522 6,663 1,143 584 03,7	10,572 10,839 7,541 556 877 03,7	10,572 10,565 8,480 518 952 03,7	10,572 10,557 9,167 683 693	558
rs, co-co-costum o alla sala, populari almategna dell'addicata	21,549 21,979 641 (a) 152 02,8	23,030 23,125 1,458 83 134 12,6	23,946 25,491 1,452 5 0	23,736 2,430 2,430 23,736	23,756 23,439 3,653 23,183 2,183	23,796 23,429 4,730 33 1,072	23,795 25,772 6,152 m 1,415 01,7	23,796 25,229 8,479 4,476 2,342 01,7	23, 795 25,058 12,573 3,679 4,096 01,7	23,796 25,251 13,869 4,712 2,446 01,7	• • • 6.255
National Association of the Control											

SOURCE: DD-6610 Retort

OASD/Chysia Programs Div. Subscent 15, 1997 Page 3 of 3

CONFIDENTIAL

### SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY CONFIDENTIAL BA

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	CY-1966	٠,			CONFID	ENTIAL		Service American
	Karch	April	May	June	July	August	September	<u>ريِّ</u>
U-Tapao (Air Force)							,	7
a. Program Amount Funded (b)	62.140	52,658	17.755	46,636	16.636	16 636	51,201	1
b. Current Working Estimate		52,728		51,534		65,513	65,103	<b>8</b>
c. Physical Completion in \$	4,022		13,241		17,955	23,040	23,031	, selection of the sele
d. Work - Planned	(a)	911	2,000	804	iR	icr	ER	***
. e. Fork - Actual	84	1,902		1,590	2,556		4,019	Articular Articular
f. Scheduled BOD (Airfield Pavements)	03,7	04,7	C4,7	C4,7	10,6	11,6	02,7	7
III. PHILIPPINES								\$100 m
Base (Service) with estimated cost							•	- Publisher
over \$10 million							•	ياهايان ليكمل فواوية ا
MS Subic Bay (Navy)					-0.4	-0.1-1		200
a. Program Amount Funded (b)	16,977			38,651			37,919 36,620	3
b. Current Horking Estimate	15,974			39,945	39,818	39,271 8,008	8,874	• 3
c. Physical Completion in \$ d. Fork - Planned	2,273	3,991 1,800	6,710 2,821	5,959 2,358	5,511	2,519	3,470	100
e. Work e. Actual	IIR	1,718	2,410	351	1,301	788	1,149	ě
f. Scheduled BOD (Port Facilities)	12,6	09,7		09,7	09.7	09,7	09,7	Carrie Carrie
IV. OKTKAWA	1		- • •	• • •	• •			ž
Base (Service) with estimated cost	•							ž
over \$10 million -	•							2
1. Kadena (Air Force)								*
a. Program Amount Funded (b)	17.835	19,293	19,907	24.057	24,057	24,057	24,057	2.
b. Current Working Estimate	18.30	10.041	20,706	23,513	23,978	27,090		2.
c. Physical Completion in \$	1,470	2,187	2,753	3,000	3,237	3,300	3,596	•;
d. Work - Planned	(a)	257	341	295	106	145	-130	•
e. Work - Actual f. Scheduled BOD (Airfield Support) 1/	184 1673	412 04,7	482 04,7	345 04,7	214 08,7	106 08,7	08,7	<b>^6</b>
	~~~	04,,	0451	04)1	00,1	00,1	00, ;	Œ.
2. Machinato (Army)			•					1
a. Program Amount Punded (b)	MYC	17,233	17,511	15,161	19,343	17,843	18,063	17
b. Current Working Estimate c. Physical Completion in \$		16,466 220	10,537	15,379 824	21,753	18,485	18,912	15
d. Work - Flanned		220	491 114	205	1,311 156		2,952 1,321	• to • id • id • id
e. Work - Actual		158		334	487	611	1,030	1
f. Scheduled BOD (Warehouse Pacilities)		10,7	10,7	10,7	10,7	16,7	04,8	04
V. Other Bases (Service) With Estimated Cost Over \$10 Million	<u>n</u>		-	•	•	•	* **	Or the state of th
1 Andanus Auro (Air Paras)								3
1. Andersen, Quan (Air Porce) a. Program Anoust Funded (b)	9,590	9,590	10,572	10,572	10,572	10,572	10,572	10=
b. Current Working Estimate	9,607	9,378	10,715	10,321	10,325	10,643	10,522	1C 🕸
c. Physical Completion in \$	1,855	2,850	3,902	4,267	5,209	6,032	10,522 6,663	7
d. Work - Planned	(a)	1,055	976	175	1,295		4,145	7 Properties
e. Work - Actual	<b>∞</b> 903	1,048		2,461			554	200
f. Schedule: BOD (Fuel Storage) d/	02,7	02,7	02,7	œ <b>,</b> 7	03,7	93,7	03,7	03
2. Ching Chuan Kang, Taiwan (Air Force)						44	eo	
a. Program Amount Fundea (b)	21,549	23,030 23,125	23,946	23,795	23,796	23,796		23.55 E
b. Current Working Estimate	21,979 641	25,125	25,491	22,554	23,439 3,553	25,429 4,730	25,772 6,152	473 83
c. Physical Corpletion in \$	(a)	1,458 83	1,472 5	2,439	13 2123	30R	IR	達
d. Work - Planned e. Work - Actual	152	134			2,163			23
f. Scheduled BOD (Airfield Pavements)	02,8	12,6	02,7	12,6	12,6	10,6	01,7	CT 2
	•	•	•	-	•	-	•	init-likiti

Notes on page 1, Table III

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### SEA CONSTRUCTION

### Program Summary and Progress

The military construction program in support of SEA operations is currently funded (through FY 1966S) at \$1,728.2 million. As of January 31, 1967, the Military Services reported that \$1,669.4 million had been released to the field. The projects started with those funds are now estimated to cost \$1,849.4 million. Construction completed on January 31 was valued at \$804.6 million, which indicates a 44 percent completion based on current cost estimates. Table 1 shows progress on the MILCON program by month and by country. A review of Work-Actual and Work-Planned for the ten reporting months shows that in all but two the actual output of the construction units, contractor's and troop (in SVN and Thailand), exceeded their planned performance. December 1966 output exceeded the planned by 16% and January 1967, 45 percent. This table summarizes the Work-in-Place performance:

### WORK-PIANNED VS WORK ACTUAL FOR ALL SEA MULCON

(\$ millions)	1966 April	May	June	July	August	
Work-Planned	28.3	40.5	46.0	41.1	44.3	
Work-Actual	30.4	41.3	40.9	59.8	59.2	
	1966 September	October	November	December	1967 January	
Work-Planned	74.7	87.9	86.2	91.9	90.8	
Work-Actual	83.1	78.7	99.3	106.6	131.3	

### Underfunding of SVN Projects

Data in the NAVFAC Construction Status Report of February 1, 1967 shows that the difference between current cost estimate and funding for projects under way in SVN is \$176.1 million. Included in the FY 1967S budget request is \$126.4 million to complete funding of the \$203.4 million cost overrun estimated in September 1966. When these FY 1967S funds are applied to the current estimate of underfunding, there is still a deficit of \$49.7 million, up \$4.6 million over 1 January. CASD(I&L) states that scope adjustments must be made to absorb any cost growth.

SOUTHEAST ASIA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION :

******	1966	A09	•••	•							1907	
1. South Visitum	Nerch	Aeril		_/#8		ANDHES		. Kieksi.		- Provider	- Jackson	Pobrate
a. Tragem Amount Punded (b) b. Correct Working Estimate	278,500 342,160	833,452 848,122	062,939 893,173	830,999	\$32.571	909,212	910,014	976,903	1,643,049	1,855,706 1,190,272 427,741	1,010,121	
e. Physical Completion	45,494	64,041	87,106	844,094 110,248	915,379	989,472 160,110	966,739 217,449	1, 211, 562 264, 852	364,127	1,190,272 U 427,741	1,264,136 534,913	
d. Work - Pleased	(a)	19,744	28,298	34,711	33.599	31,493	57,142	63,631	42,617	64,938	64,796	70,897
e. Work - Actual	**	20,626	22,976	26,768	37,543	34,281	54,678	52,441	60,718	70,710	99,133	
2. Theiland												
e. Program Assume Punded (b) b. Curriet Hucking Estimate	161,607 162,445	218,662 317,746	120,974 440,537	207,752 227,670	209,741 213,517	206,741	206,741 236,293	210,014	210,016		221,642 235,363	
r. Hysical Completion	15,596	19.252	29,457	34,804	39,583	4,731	54,217	228,357 56,366	233,236 48,334	235,049 85,414	94,434	
d. Work - Plannad a. Work - Actual	(a)	2,468	4,619	3,428	152	934	1.447	3,422	2,397	2,344	2,123	4,193
e, were - Actual	2,514	4,100	10,55^	2,741	5,503	5,144	9,780	4,771	9,740	16,579	<b>10,244</b>	
3. Philippiane											~	
a. Progress Amount Funded (b) b. Current Working Entimate	49,798 48,486	62,201 61,567	49,7 <del>49</del> 70,238	72,247 73,439	72,509 77,707	72,396 76,799	71,260 71,527	71,322 71,154	71,322 74,939	71,322 72,444	72,318 40,327	
e. Physical Completion	3,994	6,337	9,291	11,492	23,529	15,131	25,730	14,436	22,140	27,930	23,944	
d. Nort - Planned e. Nork - Actual	(a) 150	3,32A 2,275	1,523 2,867	4,343 641	2,600 2,0 <del>0</del> 4	4,160 1,553	4,853 1,760	5,423	4,431	6.331	5,700	5,005
4. Min - Willel	130	2,273	2,90/	947	2,000	1,733	1,700	9:33	3,539	2,154	4,415	
4. <u>Outs</u> 4. Program Amores Punded (b)	16 14	40 414	14 444	14 44-	14 4/-	44 4	,, ,,,				90	
b. Current Working Estimate	10,346 20,158	15,944 15,638	16,928 16,973	16,928 16,032	16,943 16,7 <b>76</b>	14,742 16,374	16,612 16,873	15,903 14,875	15,903 15,922	15,961 15,962	15,993 15,780	
c. Physical Completice	1,853	2,974	4,030	4,463	4,174	7,061	5,764	7,741	7.663	10,472	11,695	
d. Nork - Flanned a. Nork - Actual	(a)	1,135	1,610 1,071	240 2,529	1,641	1,413	1,509 624	513 1,036	1,318 1,519	1,594	8,384	1,323
		-,	-,	-1,	-,,	***		21030	*,***			
5. Skipping 4. Progress August Punios (b)	32,537	69,312	70,037	67,687	57,687	67,667	67,607	\$7,893	67,693	67,493	67,693	
b. Current Working Sociante	37,926	36,948 2,096	86,979	99,396	73,098	93,192	91,931	73.301	69,742	49,398	71.363	
e. Physical Completion 4. Vock - Flanned	1,690	2,096	3,493	4,108 679	4,912	3,743	7,744	9.665	11,037	12,743	15,001	
e. Work - Actual	(i) Xi	763	1,924	793	339 661	708 990	1,739	1,599	1,451	3,598 1,623	3,703 3,021	3,014
1			•••		***	•••	-,	-,	-,-,-			
5. Talena A. Fregres Assest Fueted (b)	22,513	23,989	24,903	24,755	24,755	24,735	24,735	24,733	24,755	24,755	24,733	
b. Current Working Encionte	23,149	23,909 24,964	26,430	23,942	24,A82	24.416	26,772	26,265	26,064	26,220	25.441	
e. Physical Completion d. Work - Pleaned	1,392	2,226 119	2,226	3,243	4,453	5,544	4,900	9,135	13,415	14,704	16,957 A,268	6,719
e. Work - Actual	236	165	41	947	2,189	1.072	1,437	4,477 2,342	3,492 4,181	4,722	1,361	4,129
7. <u>2000</u>						-	-	•	•	-•-	•	
s. Program Jarrent Puncies (b)	3,119	18,299	14,600	24,900	14.890	15,304	15,304	12,306	11.967	11,967	11,576	
b. Oursust Verbing Extinces	3,495	19,341	23,863	23,493	25,486 120	15,700	15,732	12,855	11,543	11,574	11,605	
z. Paysical Completion d: Work - Planned	(3)	942	454	144	120 81	955 239	1,176	1,737	2,041 338	2,723	2,956 570	132
u. Bort - Astril	200	130	37 64	139	261	201	m	962	323	991	498	
A. Military		2,190	2,106	2,100	2,199	1,991	1,991	1,992	1,991	1,996	1,991	
a. Progress Assocs Funded (b) b. Garress Working Estimate	-	2,196	7,100	2,160	2,190	1,575	1,576	1,576	1,382	1,362	1,005	
e. Physical Completion		•	· •	•			1	159	341	361	776 166	
d. Nock - Flamed o. Deck - Actual		:	3	11	:	:	32	26 237	136 263	134	40	233
		-	-			_	-			-	·	
9. Mile a. Program Amount Pandel (b)	1,010	1,016	1,474	1,674	1,074	1,474	1,074	2,0%	3,874	1,074	1.074	
b. Current Marking Setimate	1,616	1,010	1,469	1,44	1,471	1,471	1,633	1,436	3,462	1,463	1,666	
e. Physical Completion d. Nort - Pleaned	(a)				:	•		•	3	?	73.6	•
o, Werk - Askers	\*** <sub>*</sub>	ï	•	i	į	•	•	•	•	ī	41	•
	-		_									
M. Mittel States (Includes City &	29,475	4.44	96,712	153,019	153,277	153,218	.31,544	161,297	155,900	155,500	100,925	
h. Occupat Marking Recipute	17,394	94,421 21,385	13,539	148,014	157,929	191,962	196,006	166,627	137,476	139,663	168,976 99,867	
e. Styritaal Completion 4. test - Flores	26,427 (4)	\$2,595 984	13,510	2,437	27,929 3,227	44,372	.51,544 154, <b>00</b> 6 51,446 7,443	86,241 8,336	77,006 2,742	195,500 139,662 90,736 7,429	6,043	3,373
e. Hert - Actual	_1.271_	1.29	1,313	_tni	7,117	11111	11111	11.77	13.333	11.49	11.23	
COTALS FOR ML WERE SHERIFED THE FR	DJOCTS											
a. Program Acrest Pended (b)	570,077	1,339,874	1,590,318 1	1,392,441	3,254,441	1,471,173	1,409,824	1,943,363	1,005,768	1,610,025	1,469,466	
b. Current Working Strings c. Physical Completion	643,227 99,311	1,448,539	1,576,871	1,472,795	235,918	1,606,903 287,671	361,671	1,857,578 437,413	1,792,665	447. 430	21.007,403 804,417	
ć. Nerk - Planuci	(4)	10.216	349,449 46,946 41,533	45.900	A1 1A1	44,262	74,642 83,679	87,874	994,300 80,234	92,994	90,794	19,703
e. Berk - Accord	144	30,429	41,533	40,940	\$7, \$03	29,157	<b>83,679</b>	76,565	99.327	196,429	131,304	
Anti-termination of the second		-										

Sh. - Det Applicable
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(A) - En, stade servet grotem stärted in therch 1966.
(C) - Pended veriev 76. Sh-790, FF 45 MLASH Reprey; VL 69-20, FF 65 MLA STP: FF. 35-150, FF-66 MLASH Reprey; VL 69-213, FF 66 MLA Serve; FF. 69-213, FF. FF.

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### Jet-Capable Airbase MILCON Costs

The eight jet capable airbases in SVN will cost about \$401 million, or 37% of the total MIICON funds now approved for in-country construction. The following table summarizes the estimated costs for airfield pavements, airfield support facilities, cantonments, and communications facilities under construction at eight sites.

# SVN JET AIRFIELD CWE SUMMARY (\$ million)

Base (Service User)	Airfield Pavements	Airfield Support Facilities	a/ Cantonments	Communi- cations Facilities	TOTAL CWE
Bien Hoa (AF, A)	22.3	10.4	4.2	0.3	37.2
Cam Ranhy Bay (AF, N)	¥8 <b>.</b> 2	24.6	14.4	0.4	87.6
Chu Lai (MC)	23.3	12.7	<b>3.</b> 7 ;	1.0	40.7
Da Nang (AF, MC, A)	22.3	24.9	8.2	1.0	56.4
Phan Rang (AF)	26.0	18.1	7.6	0.9	52.6
Phu Cat (AF)	18.0	3.6	11.6	0.1	33.3
Tan Son Nhut (A, AF)	18.0	16.7	5.2	1.6	41.5
Tuy Hoa (AF)	22.4	8.9	15.3	0.3	52.0 <sup>e</sup> /

LATA SOURCE: January 1967, DD-6610 Report.

b/ Includes Ky Ha Air Facility.

d/ Includes FFCG 08, Ammunition Storage.
e/ Includes interim Port Facilities with CWE of \$5,069,000.

f/ Excludes Hospital: 200 bed with CWE of \$900,000.

CWE: Current working estimate of cost.

a/ Proportionate share of total base program that will be occupied by aviation units.

c/ Includes Marble Mountain Air Facility (Da Nang-East).

At Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa virtually no facilities existed before the military construction projects started. However, at the other sites, sizeable assets existed and the MIICON projects have added runways, parking aprons, and supporting facilities to handle high density jet aircraft operations.

# C-130 Capable Airfields in SVN

CINCPAC's requirement through FY 1968, as revalidated by message of January 24, 1967, is for 62 C-130 capable airfields in SVN (in addition to 8 jet capable and 17 other airfields). These fields will fulfill all currently known tactical and operational requirements in SVN.

The C-130 airfields selected by MACV and validated by CINCPAC are divided into three categories according to tactical use; thirty Forward Deployment Fields, twelve Logistical Airfields, and twenty Tactical Unit Bases. The pavement characteristics of these fields are summarized in this table:

Type Field	No. of Fields Req'd.	Runway	Turn- arounds, 2 Each	Taxiway	Parking Apron (Sq Ft)	Total Pavement (Sq Ft)
Fwd Deployment	30	3500'x60'	150'x150'	1260'x36'	153,000	430,860
Tactical Unit	20	3500'x60'	150'x150'	1260'x36'	153,000	430,860
Logistical	12	5000'x60'	150'x150'	2760'x36'	374,000	795,860


The runways and turnaround areas will be constructed of AM-2/MX-19 heavy duty aluminum matting and taxiways and parking aprons will be of MSA1 steel matting. Average material cost of aluminum matting is \$4.83/sq ft and \$1.35/sq ft for steel, or \$1,498,950 for a Forward Deployment Base.


locations of the 87 airfields planned for SVN are plotted on Chart 1. Changes in the tactical situation may require that some of the C-130 fields be built at other sites, but the chart shows current CINCPAC plans. This table summarizes the types of airfields by Corps Tactical Zone:

CTZ	Jet Capable	Avn Units & Helicopter	Forward Deployment	Logistical	Tactical Unit	Total Fields
IV III I	2 4 2 0	4 6 5 2	6 12 11 1	0 4 6 2	1 12 5 2	13 38 29 7
Total	8	17	30	12	30	87

In general, the C-130 fields will be built in the most expeditious manner, using matting, troop labor and expeditionary airfield techniques not requiring MCP support. The matting requirements and its availability are under close control by the Services in Vietnam and MACV J-4 so that operational needs will be met on schedule. A review of the MACV reportion to Program, South Vietnam, Status and General Requirement revised 1 December 1966, shows that requirements have been stated in permanent asphalt runways at 7 single runway fields where matting runways are also being programmed. These bases are Ban Me Thout, Phan Thiet, Dalat Cam Ly, Boa Loc, Phu Loi, Lei Khe, and Baria. Construction plans for these bases should be reviewed to confirm the type runways that will be built, so that only the necessary supporting resources are programmed and required material procured.

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### CONSTRUCTION COST GROWTH III SV:

The estimated cost to complete MILCON projects underway in SVN increased sharply during February; the underfunding (difference between current working estimate and funding) increased by \$95.2 million to a total of \$145 million, according to the March 1, 1967 NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam. This table shows the cost growth and underfunding for the past six months.

# CONSTRUCTION COST GROWTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM 8/ (\$ Million)

Total MILCON and MAP b	1966 Aug	Sep	0ct	Nov c/	1966 Dec <u>c</u> /	1967 Jan_c/	Feb.d/
Current Work- ing Estimate	862.1	1,044.9	1,147.7	1,153.3	1,173.1	1,207.2	1,302.4
Funds Released to Field	806.9	832.0	998.6	1,000.7	1,001.6	1,031.2	1,031.2
	<del> </del>		<del></del>	····			
Indicated Underfunding	55.2	515.9	149.1	152.6	171.5	176.0	271.2
Overrun Funds Not Released	203.2	203.2	143.2	143.2	143.2	126.2	126.2
Actual Under- funding	(148.0)	9•7	5.9	9.4	28.3	49.8	145.0

a/ Source: NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam (monthly).

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b/ Excludes TURNKEY, for which in February 1967 CWE = Funding = \$52.0 million.

c/ Includes funding from FY 1965R thru FY 1966S.

d/ Includes funding from FY 1962R thru FY 1966S. For FY 1962R thru FY 1964 Reprog. CWE = \$5.3 million, Funding = \$5.0 million.

CINCPAC established a study group in February, chaired by CINCPAC J-4, to study the history of SVN construction cost growth, and to determine the causes and methods of preventing it in the future. Results of the study are not yet available.

As a means for keeping construction costs within approved funds, the Level of Effort (LOE) concept was developed and is currently being placed in effect. Under this concept MACV and the O. JC-RVN will establish a financial plan within which the contractor must operate. The contractor's level of effort and workforce plans will be tailored to fit the established financial envelope. This allows contractor control on the basis of out-of-pocket expenses rather than the previous "CWE" control. Inherent in the LOE plan will be authority for the OICC-RVN to have the contractor partially complete projects. In essence the LOE plan encompasses the following:

- a. Those projects assigned for contractor completion within the contractor funding envelope.
- b. Those projects to be partially completed by the contractor within his funding and workforce level and to be finished by troop units using contractor material assets.
  - c. Those projects to be accomplished by troop construction only.
  - d. Those projects requiring appropriate scope reductions or deletion:

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### SVN LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)

The funded construction program provides \$24 million through FY 66S for LOC improvement, maintenance and new construction. In addition \$59 million has been provided in the FY 67S and FY 68 budgets for additional intrafacility programs. However, MACV has stated requirements for a major inter-facility program costing over \$200 million (in contractor costs) that has not been funded. Besides being costly, the latter program raises questions of design, security, and whether it should be funded by AID or DOD.

Current Program. The funded (through FY-1968) IOC program in SVN provides for minimal improvements to road networks local to military installations and port areas. Major bridges at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay are partially funded, and some intra-base railroad spur work has been done.

Table 1 shows existing IOC improvement projects, which are estimated to cost \$41.6 million, are funded at \$24.4 million, and were \$9.4 million complete on March 23, 1967. Excluded from this list, because the costs are unidentifiable, are projects under way for roads and railways in the the local areas of cantonments, ports, airfields, and supply facilities. Besides these projects funded in the MIICON appropriation, there are many projects for intra-facility IOC maintenance and improvement funded from O&M appropriations. This work is done by base civil engineering units and contractors. Since O&M funds are interchangeable among projects, subject only to over-all Service ceilings, it is impossible to identify the amount of construction being done with O&M funds.

The FY-1967S and FY-1968 MILCON budgets have the following funds approved for IOC improvement projects:

	(\$00	0)
	FY-1967S	FY-1968
Army	6,638	36,174
Navy	4,919	10,380
Air Force	668	None
Total	12,225	46,554

A breakdown of these funds into projects by base appears in Table 2. The projects all support military bases and operations and are therefore funded in the MILCON program.

Some of MACV's interfacility requirements in the I-CTZ will be met by construction approved for PRACTICE MINE. National Route 1 will be upgraded to a 2-lane, 35-ton capacity, all-weather road from Da Nang to Dong Ha (110 miles). The work will be done by an NMCB for an estimated material cost of \$4.6 million. In addition Route 9 from Dong Ha to Thon Son Iam (15 miles) will be upgraded to similar standards by troop labor for a cost of \$0.4 million. Bridges along these routes will be 2-way, 35-ton capacity.

Requirements. In addition to the program discussed above, MACV has stated a need for 1166 miles of priority road improvement and new construction and over 300 miles of railway main lines and spurs.

The priority road program would provide two-way, all-weather, 50-ton capacity, 22 feet wide roads with 5-foot shoulders. In general, this program would provide improvements and new construction where necessary for:

- 1. 627 miles of coastal Route 1-1A from Saigon to Dong Ha, near the DMZ;
  - 2. 95 miles of Route 9 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku;
- 3. 94 miles of Route 21 from Ninh Hoa (33 miles north of Nha Trang) west to Ban Me Thout;
  - 4. 68 miles of Route 11 from Phan Rang northwest to Dalat;
- 5. 104 miles of Route 4 from Saigon to Can Tho, in center  $\epsilon \sim$  of the Mekong Delta Region; and
- 6. 178 miles of roads connecting Saigon with Trang Bang, Phouc Vinh, Tai Khe, and Vung Tau.

These roads are plotted on Chart 1.

### VC Action Against LOC's

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Only limited data are available on Vietcong interdicting of IOC's. Chart I shows those sections of the national highway system, which MACV has given priority for improvement, which have been reported closed for at least the last three months. Intelligence data does not disclose if these roads are closed because of VC activity against traffic or because of enemy damage to the roadbed or bridges. Nor have we determined the sections closed for short periods. The CY 1967 Combined Campaign Plan for SVN set a goal of 900 miles of national and inter-provincial routes secure for unescorted travel. Recent intelligence indicates that this goal may be met, thus providing one essential element for the interfacility highway improvement program.

Funding Responsibility. The MACV national highway and railroad construction program, desired also by AID for country redevelopment, has not been funded or started. The question is who is to fund the program if it is to be initiated. The Army has responsibility for funding sabotage repair of the highways and railways. Approved OMM funds for the Army to carry out this work are the following:

	(\$ mil FY 1967S	llion) FY 1968
Highway Maintenance	13.3	3.1
Railroad Replacement	9.6	4.2

MACV feels that these funds are only enough to provide minimum support to the GVN Ministry of Public Works, and that they will not permit the major upgrading that should be undertaken.

MACV, with Embassy/Saigon and AID/Saigon support, has requested \$100 million and authority to contract with RMK-BRJ for upgrading the RVN highway system. Both CINCPAC and the JCS have endorsed MACV's request, including a proposal for AID funding of the work, and have emphasized the importance of LOC improvements to military operations in SVN. This matter will require prompt attention by OSD and AID if the funds are to be found and the contractor assigned projects starting in July 1967.

TABLE 1.

LOC Improvement Projects Funded thru FY 19668

Site	Project	Sponsor	Scheduled Completion	Cost Estimate	(\$000) Funding	CONFIDI Completed
Cam Ranh Bay	Railroad/Highway Bridge, 14CO Ft.	Army	Dec. 67	\$10,640	\$ 8,400	0
Cam Ranh Bay	13 miles Railroad to GVN Net. System	Army	Dec. 67	7,108	3,000	0
Chu <b>Lei</b>	Rosds and drainage, 8 miles	Havy	Her. 68	2,387	809	239
Da Nang	Roads and drainage, 10.5 miles	Nevy	Mar. 67	1,775	1,575	686
Da Nang	Da Hang Bridge, 5400 Ft.	Savy	Apr. 67	14,676	7,012	7,236
Da Nang	Roads, 15 miles	Kavy	Mar. 68	2,161	1,042	141
Da Mang	Roads (no scope reported)	Nevy	Mer. 68	1,472	1,107	0
The Trang	Roeds, 2 miles	Army	Mar. 67	65	65	0
Pleiku	Roads, 6 miles	Army	Feb. 67	1,071	773	1,018
Cui Mhon	Roads, 6 miles	Army	Apr. 67	150	150	50
~~~~				41,596	24.373	9,370

Source: 9 March 67, NAVFAC Ultitle Report. NILCOM funding, FY 1965 thru FY 19668


### TABLE 2

### LOC Improvement Projects Funded in FY 1967S and FY 1968

FY.	<u>19678</u>	Founding (\$000)	<u>FY 1968</u>	
	ARM	74001	ARMY	
	Newport RR Spur, 0.84 miles	265	An Khe-24 mile RR spur	7,560
	Road, Vung Ro to Tuy Hoa	3,200	An Khe09 mile RR Bridge Chen Rang-14.5 mile RR spur	4,768
	Local roads at various locations	3,173 6,638	Com Ranh Bay-4 wile RR spur Long Binh-14 sile RR spur Kemport-Rt LA Road Interchange	5,262 · 977
	MAVY  33 miles of local roads at Da Hang, Da Hang-East, Chu Lai, Phu Bai,	•	Qui Mhon-17 mile RR to Ammo erea Qui Mhon-3.3 mile RR spur Saigon-8.3 mile RR network Saigon-0.33 mile RR Bridge	7,560 1,758 4,560 1,260 5,282 - 977 5,361 2,605 6,449 35,174
	Cam Ranh Bay, and Game Warden bases in Delta	4,919	TVAK	•
	AIR FORCE	-	Local reads at Da Heng, De Nang-East, Chu Lai,	10 <del>25</del> 0
	30 miles of local roads at Bien Hoa, Binh Thuy, Com Renh Bay, Da Hang, and Kha Trang	66A	end Phu Bei AIR FORCE	10,300 None
	Total FY 1967S Funding	12,225	Total FY 1968 Funding	46,55h

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### CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM SUMMARY AND PROGRESS

The following table summarizes the status of SEA MILCON funding, estimated cost, and work completed as of March 30, 1967.

	FUNDING			FY 1966S AND PRIOR PROJECTS Funds				
(\$000)	FY 1966S & Prior	FY 19678 FY 1968		Released	Current Working Est.	\$ Completion	% Completion	
svn	1,089	474	1,563	1,0880/	1,356b/	731 <u>b</u> /	54	
Other	639	4642/	1,103	58 <u>,°</u> /	591 <b>c</b> /	329 <sup>c</sup> /	55	
TOTAL	1,728	938	2,666	1,672	1,947	1,060	54	

a/ Includes \$200 million DOD worldwide Contingency Fund.

Re: 1 April 1967 NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam, plus TURNKEY.

Re: March 1967 DD-6610 Reports.

During March contractor (RMK-BRJ) and troop work-in-place in SVN fell about 21% short of their planned output (\$85 million vs. \$107 million).

The apparent cost overrun (excess of planned scope cost over available funds) for SVN construction dropped by about \$4 million during March. The table above shows that the current cost estimate for projects started exceeds the released funds by \$268 million. When the \$126 in FY 1967S overrun funds are applied to the current estimate of underfunding, there is still a deficit of \$142 million.

The Level of Effort (LOE) system for control of contractor construction in SVN discussed in the April <u>SEA Analysis Report</u> was started on April 1. Under this concept the total contractor effort will be sized to live within funds available. In addition, a site-by-site reappraisal of construction plans is being conducted by MACV to make appropriate scope adjustments and assign the remaining work to the contractor or troop units. The LOE concept is designed to get the maximum construction from the available construction dollars.

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### MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

#### SVN Summary

As of June 30, 1967, the approved (through FY 19678) military construction program in SVN was 63.5% complete. Work assigned to the contractors was 6% done, and troop projects, 3%. Port facilities in the approved program are 92% complete, while sirfields are 71%, troop housing and utilities 51%, and hospitals and dispensaries 75%. Table 1 summarizes the status of SVN MIICON funding, estimated cost, and work completed by contractor and troops.

The apparent cost overrun (excess of planned scope cost over available funds) has dropped to \$43 million, down \$100 million from that indicated on March 30, 1967. As a part of the Level of Effort management system now used in SVN, many projects are still being evaluated for conversion from contractor to troops. These changes will bring the cost in terms of military construction funds of FY 1966S and prior year projects to within available MCP funds.

# TABLE 1 STATUS OF SVN MILCON

	(\$ M	illion)	:	Over/ (Under)-		
	FUNDS	CWE	COMPL.	COMP.	Funding (\$Million)	
ALL SERVICES						
Contract	1,204.4	1,237.2	851.6	68.8	(32.8)	
Troop	253,0	565.9	101.3	38,5	('9.9)	
TOTAL	1,457.4 b/	1,500.1	952.9	63.5	(42.7)	

Data Source: MILCON Status Report, SVN. dated July 7, 1967 (End of June 1967 Report).

a/ All Funding Programs, FY 1964 through FY 1967S.
b/ Additional approved funding for SVN incudes \$2.5 million for AF MAP,
FY 64 and Prior, work completed; \$1.45 million AF Unassigned; and
\$9.735 million OCCC Undistributed.

#### SVN CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM SUMMARY AND PROGRESS

On 30 September 1967, the approved (through FY 678) military construction program in SVN was 66% complete. The funded program is divided 82% contractor and 18% for troop construction. (Since only the construction materials part of the troop effort is charged to the MilCon appropriation, the scope of work is divided almost equally between contractor and troop effort.) The contractor program is 71% complete while the troop assigned program is 37% complete. Table 1 summarizes the status of SVN MILCON funding by Service. Not included in the funding totals is \$55.6 million in the FY 68 regular MILCON program for SVN or any portion of the FY 68 contingency funds.

TABLE 1

## Status of SVN MILCON (\$ millions)

Sources '	funds f	Completed	Completed (%)
Army Navy Ai:: Force	77 356 <b>384</b>	430 25 <u>1</u> 280	71 71 71
Subtotal	1,477	961	66
Other	_315	<u>N/A</u>	N/A
Total	1,792		

Source: Construction Report Vietnam dated 1 Oct 67 (End of September Report).

- a/ Includes MAP transfers (all from FY 1962-1966), AID, AIK, State Dopartment, and miscellaneous.
- b/ FY 1968 funds not included.

The lag of the Army program behind the Navy and Air Force reflects the Army's greater use of military troop effort. Contractor construction capability reached a peak in July 1966, whereas the major buildup of military construction units did not occur in SVN until 4 to 10 months later.

A closer analysis of the work completed shows that several categories in the Army program are considerably less than 50% completed (based on percentage of current working estimate), and all of these are lagging the construction plan. These are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Status of Army Low Priority Construction Program

Category	Flanned	Actual	Actual less Planned
Communications Facilities	41%	40%	- 1%
Operations Bldg.	60%	45%	- 1% -15%
Maint. Facilities	51% 41%	40% 38%	-11% - 3% - 4%
Ammo. Storage	41%	38%	- 3%
Covered Storage	27%	- 23%	- 4%
Community Facilities	29%	27%	- 2%
Roads & RR	59%	45%	-14%

Source: Army Buildup Progress Report dated 8 November 1967.

The above percentages reflect MACV action in assigning highest priority to operational facilities such as ports and major airfields and lower priority to logistical facilities, particularly covered storage.

#### Level of Effort (LOE) System

The IOE system for control of contractor construction in SVN was discussed in the April and May SEA Analysis Reports. The system was initiated on 1 April 1967 to get maximum construction from the available construction dollars and to prevent costly overruns. Since that time contractor personnel strength and construction capability have decreased substantially as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3
CONTRACTOR (RMK-BRJ) CONSTRUCTION EFFORT

		Work For	ce		WIP .	Average
Date	Total	U.S.	FW	VN	\$ millions)	Placement/Man
Jun 66 Sep 66 Dec 66 Mar 67 Jun 67 Sep 67 Oct 67	48,886 44,091 44,207 31,697 22,228 15,891 15,000	3,832 3,726 3,529 2,900 1,967 1,402 (target)	5,028 5,543 5,231 4,322 2,238 1,195	40,026 34,822 35,447 24,475 18,023 13,294	28.9 36.8 47.1 53.5 36.4 14.5	\$ 591 835 1064 1688 1638 912

Source: NAV FAC

a/ Totals as of the end of the month.

Contractor reached a peak strength of over 51,000 in July 1966 and is now approaching his planned strength of 15,000 by the end of October 1967. Correspondingly, the construction capability has been reduced from a high of \$58 million to \$14.5 million in September 1967. The Contractor work force has been regrouped into three major enclaves - Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon/Delta for more efficient utilization of his reduced resources. The current LOE labor plan calls for phasing out the contractor starting in October 1968. If Congress substantially reduces funds requested for FY 1968, an earlier phase out may be required.

#### Military Engineer Strength

As of 30 September 1967 the total Engineer strength in SVN is as shown in table 4.

#### TABLE 4

## Military Engineer Strength (Thousands)

Service	Total Force	Engineers	Percentage
Army	297.5	35.9	12.1
Navy - MC	105.2	17.0	16.2
Air Force	56.8	4.7	8.3
Total	459.5	57.6	12.5

In SVN one man out of every eight is an engineer. Engineers are organized into some 52 battalions or equivalents, 42 separate companies and several miscellaneous detachments. In WWII the engineer strength in the South Pacific Theater averaged 16.2% of the Army strength. During the Korean War Army engineers made up about 14% of the Army troops in Korea. Data for the other Services is not available.

January 68

#### SVN FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

The FY 69 South Vietnam Military Construction Program approved by the Secretary of Defense totals \$282.8 million including a \$70 million SEA contingency fund; an additional \$30 million contingency fund is provided for world-wide use. The FY 69 program is about \$137 million larger than the \$146 million provided in the FY 68 program (\$65.7 million plus an estimated \$80 million contingency) but considerably less than the programs in FY 66 and 67 (\$973 and \$394 million respectively). Table 1 summarizes the history of SVN construction funding. Table 2 shows the funds made available by Calendar year. The dollars provided to the field peaked in 1966 at nearly \$800 million and have declined significantly in subsequent years.

TABLE 1
SVN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS
(\$ Millions)

Program	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total <sup>a</sup> /
FY 65 Basic FY 65 Supplement FY 66 Basic FY 66 Amendment FY 66 Supplement FY 67 Supplement FY 68 Basic FY 68 Contingency FY 69 Basic FY 69 Contingency	14.7 36.0 29.8 36.0 424.2 217.6 31.4 b/ 144.1 c/	9.4 17.4 30.3 32.9 189.0 76.1 10.4 b/ 54.1 c/	16.2 20.9 13.5 39.2 178.2 100.2 23.9 b/ 14.6 <u>c/</u>	40.4 74.4 73.6 108.1 791.5 393.8 65.7 <sub>b</sub> / 80.0 212.8 70.0
Total	933.8	419.6	406.8	1,910.0

Source: RCS DD-1&L(6727)

a/ Does not add due to rounding.

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b/ FY 68 contingency not broken out. Eighty million exhimated for use in SVN.

c/ In addition to \$70 million in FY 69 contingency funds for SEA, each Service has a \$10 million contingency fund for world-wide use, some of which may be used in SEA.

### TABLE 2

## CONSTRUCTION FUNDING ON YEARLY BASIS (\$ Millions)

	<u>cy 64</u>	CY 65	<u>cy 66</u>	CY 67	<u>cy 68</u>	TOTALE
FY 65	40.4	74.4	# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	-	-	114.7
fy 66 fy 67	-	181.7	791.5	393.8 <sub>5/</sub>	-	973.1 393.8
fy 68 fy 69	-	-	-	145.75	282.8¢/	145.7 282.8
11 09	40.4	256.0	791.5	539.5	282.8	1910.0

a Totals do not add due to rounding.

b/ Includes \$80 million from contingency fund.

/ Includes \$70 million from contingency fund.

#### FY 69 Program

The FY 69 program is about half the amount requested by the JCS and the Military Departments as shown in Table 3.

#### TABLE 3

#### FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM - SVN (\$ Millions)

	Army	Lavy	Air Force	Contingency	Total
Military Department Recommendations JCS Recommendation OSD Alternate Frogr	\$317.5 \$314.9 <sub>3/</sub>	\$232.0 \$199.69/ \$ 54.1	\$50.1 \$23.2°/ \$14.6	- 70.0 <u>b</u> /	\$599.6 \$537.7 \$282.8

a/ Approved program includes 341 million for LOC/highway rehabilitation that was not contained in the JCS and Department's recommended programs.

b/ Does not include an added contingency fund of \$10 million for each of the Military Departments which may be applied to unanticipated construction requirements world-wide.

c/ JCS did not address all requirements.

The bulk of the hard core facilities (ports, airfields, storage, troop housing, mairtenance, etc.) was funded prior to this year. As a result, about 65% of the recommended programs of the Departments consisted of up-grading existing facilities (housing, hospitals, etc.), provision of welfare and community buildings, and furnishing utilities. While these projects might have aided movale and comfort of the troops and perhaps increased somewhat the efficient operation of our support forces, most were either not essential or would not have had sufficient probable use to amortize their cost. Deletion or delay in construction of these projects should not have an adverse effect on military operations.

#### Army Program

The Army requested \$317.5 million of which 65% was for added and upgrading of troop housing, community facilities, utilities and ground improvements. Table 4 compares the Army proposed program and the approved OSD alternative program by major project category.

# ARMY FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION - SVN (\$ Millions)

Type Facility	DA Request	OSD Approved
Operational	\$ 16.4 43.1	\$ 3.5
Maintenance	43.1	10.2
Supply	27.2	3.2
Hospital/Medical	21.0	5.1
Administrative	2.3	•
Troop Housing/Community	146.1	61.9
Utilities/Real Estate	61.4	19.2
LOC Rehabilitation	-	41.0
Total	\$317.5	\$144.1

The Secretary of Defense added \$41 million to the Army program for construction and rehabilitation of major lines of communication.

#### Navy Program

The Navy requested \$232 million for FY 69; the approved program totaling \$51.1 million provides the urgent items in support of Program 5 deployments and anticipated military operations in Vietnam (largely in the I CTZ). The most significant new requirements were in support of the buildup in the Phu Bai complex which includes Hue, Dong Ha and Quang Tri. In addition, funds were provided for limited upgrading of troop housing and utility systems in various other locations.

# TABLE 5 NAVY FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (\$ Millions)

Type Facility	DN Request	OSD Approved
Operational and Training	\$ 58.0	\$ 14.9
Maintenance	18.7	6.1
Supply	33.0	5.0
Hospital/Medical	5.4	.1
Administrative	5.9	1.1
Troop Housing/Community	44.2	12.2
Utilities/Ground Improvements	54.8	10.7
LOC I CTZ	12.0	4.0
Total.	\$232.0	\$ 54.12

a/ Does not contain any portion of the recommended contingency fund.

#### Air Force Program

The Air Force request totaled \$50.1 million and consisted primarily of Program 4 related requirements and replacement and upgrading of existing aircraft aprons, runways, housing and utility systems. The Air Force only had a few Program 5 force increases, thus a large requirement for new facilities did not exist. The approved alternative program of \$14.6 million provided for limited operational, maintenance, supply, living quarters, and utilities.

# AIR FORCE FY 69 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (\$ Millions)

Type Fecility	AF Request	OSD Approved
Operations & Training	\$24.5	\$ 8.1
Maintenance	2.5	1.4
Supply	1.7	1.2
Hospital/Medical	<u>-</u>	•
Administrative	.2	-
Troop Housing/Community	4.2	1.9
Utilities, Ground Improvements	17.0	2.0
LOC	•	•
Total	\$50.1	\$14.6

#### Contingency

The OSD approved program contains \$100 million for contingencies. Seventy million is earmarked for new requirements in Southeast Asia that cannot be foreseen at this time. In addition, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each were provided a \$10 million contingency fund for construction in support of operations world-wife.

#### Other Military Construction Costs

Military construction appropriations constitute only a portion of the total dollar cost of the construction effort in South Vietnam. Substantial amounts of operation and maintenance (C&M) and procurement funds are also used to support the construction effort. For example, much of the upgrading and finishing work on cantonments is done with O&M funds and bridging material and airfield matting are purchased with procurement funds. Only fragmentary information is available on accunts of O&M and procurement funds used in the construction effort. Our preliminary estimate is that they now total about \$160 million per year. We hope to acquire better data on this question. In the coming months.

An even larger element of cost is the pay, allowances and normal operating expenses of the U.S. military personnel in construction units in Vietnam. At present we have 49 engineer battalions in SVN. In addition, there are a large number of smaller units (e.g., dump truck companies, light equipment companies) supporting the engineering battalions which raise the total number of military engineering personnel to about 60,000. Divisional combat

bettalions are engaged almost entirely in combat support and do not contribute to the construction effort. A portion of the effort of the other battalions is also devoted to combat support, maintenance, mapping, etc., not new construction. We estimate that 43,600 military personnel are actually engaged in military construction work. An estimated \$550 million is required annually for the operations (including pay) of these 43,000 engineer personnel.

Thus, the total cost of the construction effort in South Vietnam during FY 69 will be closer to \$1 billion than the \$282 million in the military construction funds for FY 69 that were approved by the SecDef.

#### Expected Change in Future MilCon Programs

Even though the hard core major facility requirements in Vietnam have been largely provided for, limited amounts of military construction funds will continue to be required as long as we maintain a sizeable presence there. Funds will be necessary to provide for essential upgrading or replacement of existing substandard facilities, to meet contingency requirements, and to provide for adjustments in the base structure as they occur. Additionally, as facilities are built, more and more resources (funds and personnel) must be allocated to maintenance and repair. This will most likely result in growing requirements for O&M funds.

One area that will undoubtedly require large inputs of construction and O&M funds for years to come is LOC construction and rehabilitation to support military operations and economic development. There are 2800 miles of major roads in the Vietnamese highway system that require maintenance and upgrading. The road beds are in bad condition in many places and bridges that have been destroyed have to be replaced. The rail net must be rehabilitated and modernized as much of it is virtually worthless. Many of the key canals and waterways must be reopened and cleared of debris and silt. To accomplish this work will probably require the use of U.S. and ARVN military engineers or civilian contractors or both. The costs will undoubtedly be very heavy and the requirements could be virtually open-ended.

House 68

#### SVN CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS

The presently funded SVN construction program is approximately 70% completed. Approved military and contractor construction forces should be able to complete the assigned military construction program by early CY 1970. Barring a major increase in US forces or a decision to rebuild communication lines and civilian facilities, we should begin phasing out the 18,000-man contractor force and withdrawing some of the 60,000 military construction troops about mid-1969. The status of construction in South Vietnam as of end February is shown on the table below:

## CONSTRUCTION STATUS (\$ Millions)

	- •	-	
Service	Programa/	WIP	Percent Complete
Army Navy Air Force Total	\$ 813.1 365.4 379.6 \$1558.1	\$ 504.9 265.1 313.1 \$1083.1	62% 73% 82 <u>%</u> 70%

SOURCE: RCS DD-I&L #6727 dated February 29, 1968.

#### Current Engineer Deployments

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At the present time there are 64 engineer battalions/squadrons in SVN and nearly 200 smaller engineer units. These units are manned by approximately 60,000 engineer troops. The bulk of these personnel (approximately 55,500) are assigned construction and combat and combat support missions, while the rest are engaged in such activities as "repairs and utilities," maintenance and supply, mapping, staff, and advisory roles. Of these, 16,500 engineer personnel are in units organic to or in direct support of the divisions. Thus, about 40,000 engineer personnel are available for projects funded by the military construction appropriation. The engineer units in SVN are shown below:

#### ENGINEER UNITS IN SVN

	Bde/Agency	Gps/Regt	Ens/Sqdns	Co's	Misc
Army	3	7	33 <u>ª</u> /	40	133
Navy	1	2	12,	2	12
Marine Corps	2	-	5 <u>b</u> /,	2	1
Air Force	•	1	14¢/	-	_
	<b>⊐</b> ;	10	64	44	146

SOURCE: MACV Strength Report dated March 28, 1968 Data as of February 29, 1968.

a/ Includes 7 Division Bns.

b/ All 5 considered Division Ens. c/ Includes 9 Base Civil Engineer squadrons.

a/ Includes \$55.8 million FY 1968 regular program plus \$24.0 million from the FY 67 contingency fund.

#### CLRCPAC Construction Review

A recent CINCPAC review, held on 25-28 March 1968, showed that currently deployed construction units, augmented by the RMK-BRJ contractor, should be able to complete the assigned military construction program by February 1970. The fold out table shows the projected capability and the approved construction program.

Barring a major increase in US forces which would generate new construction requirements, or a decision to rebuild the road, canal, rail net or other non-military projects, a phase-down of our construction capability may begin next year. Decision is required as to whether to retain the contract capability, and begin withdrawing US forces, or hold on to the military capability as long as possible. Retaining the military units gives the most construction output for each dollar of MCP funds. Using the contractor permits a reduction in US personnel (and probably in the total cost) and has "nation-building" advantages.

#### Construction Trends

The troop construction effort has gradually shifted from military construction projects to lines of communications (LOC) maintenance and combat support. A year ago over 60% of the troop effort was devoted to military construction funded projects. Now, only 40% of the troop effort is for Milcon, with over 60% now funded from procurement and operations appropriations. Should this trend continue, completion of the Milcon program will be delayed and more 08M funds will be needed. The breakdown of the work during March is shown below:

#### ENGINEER CAPABILITY UTILIZATION

Agent	Milcon	LOC	Other Combat Support
Army Units	40%	20%	40 <b>%</b>
Navy Units	40%	20% 20%	40%
Air Force Units	32%	-	68%
Contractor	90%	5%	5%
SOURCE: CINCPAC R 300	218, March	1968.	

Moreover, a number of engineer units have been relocated. A year ago all construction in I CTZ was performed by contractor or Navy construction battalions. Most of the units were located south of the Hai Van pass in the Hue and Da Nang areas. The Army had construction responsibility for II, III and IV CTZ. The Air Force units were engaged in air base construction assisted by Army and Navy units and the contractor.

However, with the deployment of additional Marine and Army units to I CTZ, several engineer units have moved from II and III CTZ, delaying the completion of some on-going projects. At present, there are seven Army

engineer battalions (including three divisional battalions) in I CTZ. An additional Seabee battalion was deployed in February and 60% of the Navy horizontal construction capability has moved north of Hai Van Pass to work on LOC maintenance and upgrading.

The RMK-BRJ contractor will increase his work force because of an added workload rather than decrease it as had been planned in the fall. The original goal as outlined in the Full Funding Concept dated February 28, 1967 was to reduce the force to 15,000 personnel. The current RMK-BRJ work force is 17,844 (1399 US, 1280 TCN, and 15,165 LN) and they can expand the work force to 22,000 personnel if required. The extent and rate of the buildup will depend on the funds made available, the rate at which projects can be assigned, the availability of contractor capability in the area where the work is to be done, and the urgency of the work.

## MACY CAPABILITY FORECAST (Includes FY 1968 & Prior Programs) (\$ Millions)

	CONSTRUCTION WORKLOAD				
,	FY 678 & Prior	FY 678 & Prior Adjusted	FY 64	FY 69	Total;
PART I Troop Capability Based on Units Included in Program #5 & #6					
ARMY No: Bns In-Countrys/ Capability 1/2	121.9	80.42/	4.3	30.0	114.7
NAVY No. Bus In-Country Capability A	27.1	33.05/	4.8	13.5	51.3
AIR FORCE  Ko. Bas In-Countrys/ Capabilicyl/1/	11.3	6. <b>3¢</b> /	2.2	2.2	10.7
Sub-totals	160.3	119.7	11.3	45.7	176.7
Capability (Quarterly) Cumulative Workload Remaining					
PART II	380 P	205.34/	306.4	166.3	497.6
Contractor Capability	779.8	205.30	120.0	100.3	491.0
Cumulative Workload Remaining			•		
PART III					1
Combined Troop Contractor Capability		205.0		<b>6</b> 70.6	Calcal
Cumulative Workload Remaining	440.1	325.0	137.3	212.0	674.3

a/ Workload adjusted by \$41.5 M1: \$5.9 transferred to Navy Troops; Est. \$15 M1 transferred to b/ \$5.9 M1 Army Troop transferred to Navy Troop c/ \$5.0 Mil troop to contractor.

e/ \$5.0 Mil troop to contractor.

d/ Workload adjusted by \$74.5 Mil -\$50.0 Mil contractor prepaid assets; -\$4.5 Mil error correct e/ Includes \$55.8 FY 68 basic plus \$81.3 Mil FY 68 contingency. Does not include \$10 Mil for a f/ FY 69 contingency not included. (\$212 million basic)

Based on approved deployments as of April 3, 1968, does not include seven divisional enginee.

Total troop effort available has been reduced to provide for combat support & O&M projects.

I/ Includes \$1 Mil/month for Vinnell Contractor.

J/ MACV estimated capability; \$3.4 K Army troop for 27 engr bns; \$2.1 K Mary troop for 12 NMCBs

k/ RMK-BRJ workforce increased to 19,000 in May. Contractor capability \$1 million per 1000 em

L/ RMK-BRJ workforce increased to 20,000 in August.

m/ Excess capability available.

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CAPABILITY FORECAST

rider pr 68	<u>FY 69</u>	Total;	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	1968 <u>3rd Qtr</u>	4th Qtr	lst Qtr	2nd Qtr	1969 <u>3rd Qtr</u>	4th Qtr	1970 1st Qtr
Mariantico de la contrata del contrata de la contrata de la contrata del contrata de la contrata del la contrata de la contrata del la contrata de la contra	30.0	114.7	26.0 13.2	27.0 13.4	28.0 13.6	28.0 13.8	28.0 13.8	28.0 13.8	28.0 13.8	28.0 13.8	28.0 13.8
4.8	13.5	51.3	12.0 5.9	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3	12.0 6.3
2.2 11.3		10.7 176.7	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2	5.0 1.2
			20.3 156.4	20.9 135.5	21.1 114.4	21.3 93.1	21.3 71.8	21.3 50.5	21.3 29.2	21.3 7.9	21.3 (20.5)
126.0	166.3	497.6	54.0 443.6	56.0 <sup>k</sup> / 387.6	7 59.0 <sup>1</sup> / 328.6	60.0 268.6	60.0 208.6	60.0 148.6	60.0 88.6	60.0 28.6	60.0
137.3	212.0	674.3	74.3 600.0	76.9 523.1	80.1 443.0	81.3 361.7	81.3 280.4	81.3 199.1	81.3 117.8	81.3 36.5	81.3 (71.9)

: Est. \$15 Mil transferred to contractor; Est \$20.6 Mil WIP not reported.

Does not include \$10 Mil for shelters.

miude seven divisional engineer bns(units become effective 2nd month in-country) or 5 USMC bns.

12.1 M Navy troop for 12 NMCBs; \$.4 M Air Force troop for 5 CE squadrons.

OASD/SA April 18, 1968

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May 68

#### THAILAND CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

The approved military construction program in Thailand for FY 68 and prior years is 70% complete as of March 31, 1968 (see Table 1). By the end of this year practically all of the FY 67S and prior programs will be completed.

#### TABLE 1

## CONSTRUCTION STATUS (\$ Millions)

Service	Program	Work in Place	Percent Complete
Army Navy Air Force	114.7 <sup>8</sup> / 16.0 <sup>9</sup> / 235.8 <sup>9</sup> / 366.5	70.3 13.5 174.7 258.5	61 84 <u>74</u> 70

Source: RCS: DD-I&L (THN) 6727 March 31, 1968 Report

a/ Includes \$1.7 million FY 68R program.
b/ Includes \$1.9 million FY 68R program.
c/ Includes \$18.4 million FY 68R program.

About one-quarter of the Army construction program is being done by troops and three-quarters by contract. The Navy program is being constructed entirely by contract and over 90% of the Air Force program is assigned to contractors.

#### Future Milcon Program

The military construction program in Thailand is rapidly being completed with no major new requirements anticipated. The FY 70 construction program should be less than the \$12.6 million projected for FY 69. Table 2 shows the Milcon program by Fiscal Year.

## THAILAND MILCON PROGRAM (\$ Millions)

		(φ Μ	Troite \			
	FY66 & Prior	FY 678	FY 68	Projected FY 68S	Projected FY 69	Total
Air Force	134.9	82.6	26.8c/	3.0	3.0	250.3
Navy	13.9	-	2.18/	**	.6	16.6
Army	<u>73.4</u>	39.6	1.7	2.0	9.0	125.7
Total	255.2	122.2	30.6	5.0	12.6	392.6

Source: OSD(I&L)SEA Construction Division.

a/ \$199,000 being reprogrammed to the Philippines.

b/ Contains \$1.9 million for Laos.

c/ Includes \$8.5 million FY 68 Contingency.

Current construction backlog is about \$100 million. The contractors are placing \$10 million work-in-place (WIP) per month. The troop units are placing another \$1 million per month. As of April 3, 1968, the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC) Bangko. Pected to have all but three contracts awarded. The current OICC estimate is that work will be largely completed by April 1969. Architect-engineer contracts will have been reduced to three by July 1968 from a high of 29 in January 1967. The two Cost-Plus-Adjusted-Fee (CPAF) contractors should be phased out by end FY 69. Residual work or new requirements can easily be accomplished by local contractors (who do high quality and low cost work) and US military construction units.

Use of Military Construction Units

The major engineer units in Thailand consist of one engineer construction group, nine engineer battalions/squadrons and some 23 smaller engineer companies and detachments totaling nearly \$400 military personnel. Of these troops only 3200 are available for use in the military construction program. The remainder (1200) are utilized on repairs and utilities, maintenance, advisory and other miscellaneous assignments. Engineer troop make up 9.5% of the military population in Thailand.

TABLE 3
ENGINEER UNITS IN THAILAND

Service	Gp	Bn/Sqdns	Co's	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	Total Personnel
Army	1	2	4	13	2818
Navy/MC	-	-	-	5	84
Air Force	-	7ª/	-	1	1478
Total	1	9	<del>4</del>	19	4380

Source: CINCPAC RCS 5314-2 dtd March 31, 1968. a/ Includes 6 Base Civil Engineer Squadrons (1056 sirmen).

The mission of the Army's 44th Engineer Group (Construction) consists of road building, construction of training facilities for the Thai Voluntary Division force, and providing facilities for the logistic infrastructure. The Air Force Red Horse Squadron (556 CE Squadron, Heavy Repair) is divided among the six major Air Force bases. Its work consists of revetment and lighting construction, emplacement of relocatable facilities such as modular dispensaries and hospitals, and erection of pre-engineered storage and maintenance facilities. We estimate that less than 50% of the Red Horse construction is funded by the military construction program.

#### Construction Augmentation

Both the Arm, and the Air Force use rental contracts to obtain large amounts of construction equipment to augment their organic capability. These contracts provide equipment with local operators and mechanics. These augmentations together with direct hire Local National laborers and military supervisors provide a substantial increase to troop construction capability. During the 1st half of FY 68, the Army spent over \$2 million for equipment rental services and the total cost for the year is expected to exceed \$4 million. The Air Force has at least eight contracts totaling \$3.1 million in FY 68, almost entirely from operations and maintenance funds.

The Army in Thailand employs about 2500 Local Nationals of which 2200 are paid from Milcon funds. The Air Force employs another 4300 Local Nationals in addition to the 1700 LN utilized by the six Rase Civil Engineer squadrons.

Thus, overall, the troop construction capability in Thailand has been augmented by 400 major items of equipment (185 Army, 211 Air Force) at a cost of over \$7 million. The military work force on troop construction projects has been further augmented by 6800 Local Nationals.

#### SEA MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

FY 70 marks the first time since the US involvement in the conflict in South Vietnam that no military construction (MILCON) funds are being programmed for SEA construction. A \$25 million world-wide contingency fund is being requested for unforeseen projects that may occur. Since FY 65, about \$2.8 billion has been provided to support the war effort in SEA. Table 1 summarizes the history of SEA military construction funding by fiscal year. Table 2 (enclosed) breaks out the construction program by country and indicates progress.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION

IN SUPPORT OF SEA

(\$\frac{1}{2}\$ Millions)

Program	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Transfers from MAP	65.8	-	•	65.8
FY 1965	59.5	37.0	69.6	166.1
FY 1966	655.1	352.8	430.7	1,438.6
FY 1967	288.5	133.9	190.4	612.8
FY 1968	142.8	60.6	111.8	315.2
FY 1969	108.8	56.4	16.5	181.7
Total	1,320.5	640.7	819.0	2,780.2

Of the \$2.8 billion authorized, \$1.7 billion (64%) has been used in SVN; \$367 million in Thailand (14%); and \$588 million (22%) for training, operational and logistical support bases in CONUS and the western Pacific bases. This work was nearly 80% complete by and of February 1969. The major elements of the construction program in SVN include:

- a, Six deep water ports at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro, Vung Tau, and Saigon with 27 deep draft berths providing capacity of 600,000 short tons per month (Saigon was the only deep draft port prior to US involvement). In addition, shallow draft facilities were provided at nine other ports to handle 800,000 short tons per month of coastal shipping. Mooring buoys and unloading facilities capable of discharging 1,250,000 barrels of POL daily were constructed at or near the various ports.
- b. Eight jet-capable air bases with fifteen 10,000 foot concrete runway/taxiway systems and parking aprons (3 existed prior to 1965). In

TABLE 2

## AUTHORIZATION BY COUNTRY (FY 1965 - 1969 SEA Construction) (\$ Millions)

	Country	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total 1/	% Complete 28 Feb 69	%/Country
	Vietnem	887.0	418.7	411.0	1,716.7	77.0	64.1
	Thailand	122.1	15.0	237.2	374.3	89.2	14.0
	Okinawa	28.4	9.7	30.7	68.8	92.8	2.6
	Philippine	s -	68.6	19.4	88.0	87.2	3.3
	Korea	51.5	-	46.0	97.5	12.8	3.6
	Taiwan	-	.2	27.2	27.3	91.9	1.0
	Guan	.5	8.9	12.1	21.5 ;	86.0	.8
	Japan	10.1	5.4	2.5	18.0	90.8	.7
	United States	163.9	84.7	11.8	260.3	92.2	9.7
	Other <u>2</u> /	.8	1.6	4.5	7.0	<u> 85.1</u>	2
•	Total 1/	1,264.2	612.8	802.4	2,67 <b>9.</b> 4 <u>3</u> /	78.8	10.0

SOURCES: Table 600 Military Construction in Support of SEA, Feb 28, 1969. Format II RCS DD-I&L(M) 915, dtd Feb 28, 1969.

<sup>1/</sup> May not add due to rounding

<sup>2/</sup> Other includes countries such as Midway, Wake, Laos, Canal Zone, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.

<sup>3/</sup> Total varies from Table 1 by unapportioned FY 69 funds.

addition, there are some 83 auxillary logistical airfields capable of handling C-123 or C-130 type aircraft. The facilities support over 5,750 aircraft of all types.

- c. 9760 hospital beds for US and Free World personnel.
- d. Four major depot complexes at Na Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh. Each of these complexes support a deep water port and two or more major air bases.
  - e. Maintenance and upgrading of 2537 miles of Vietnamese highways.

In Theiland, the construction program provided operational, logistical, and personnel support facilities for 49,000 US personnel. Major facilities include: expansion of six existing Royal Thai Air bases; construction of a new \$110 million airbase at U-Tapao with 11,500 foot runway for B-52s; a deep water fort and depot complex at Sattahip; a forward depot at Korat; and about 300 miles of new and upgraded roads. The Thailand program is nearing completion and our construction capability there is being phased down.

Support facilities for aircraft, waterfront operations, ship repair, storage of supplies, POL, and ammunition, maintenance of aircraft and equipment, communications and troop housing were provided in the offshore Pacific Islands. CONUS construction in support of SEA consisted primarily of an expansion of the training base.

The bulk of the remaining construction workload is located in SVN. On March 1, 1969, MACV had a work backlog of \$409 million. All other SEA countries combined had a MILCON workload remaining of \$159 million. The rest of this paper focuses on the work still to be completed in SVN.

#### SVN Construction

Periodic six-month reviews are being made of the SVN construction capabilities, workload and requirements by the JCS and OSD. These reviews are being performed to reduce unobligated backlogs, and to match funding with capabilities and requirements. Work remaining to be placed is divided between the contractor (\$260 million) and the military troops (\$149 million). While the contractor has the largest part of the funds (64%) remaining, the troops actually have more projects to be completed since troop costs are largely unfunded by the MILCON program. The generally accepted ratios of MILCON costs between troop and contractor is 1:2.5 to 3. Total costs are estimated to be about equal.

Contract construction in SVN is performed under the supervision of the Navy Facilities Engineering Command through its field office in Saigon. Project directives are prepared and approved by MACV for submittal to OICC (Office In Charge of Construction). OICC prepares the design and assigns the work to its contractors for construction. The bulk of the contract construction in SVN is accomplished by Raymond, Morrison, Knudson - Brown, Root and Jones (RMK-BRJ) operating under a

cost-plus-adjusted fee (CPAF) contract. Its work force consists of about 25,500 personnel and is staffed and equipped to construct about \$22 million per month of MILCON work. The contractor requires about \$100 million of useable backlog (projets designed, notice to proceed issued, and materials ordered or on hand) in order to operate efficiently. Hence, it was recognized at the time of the FY 70 budget reviews that no FY 70 MILCON program for SVN would require phasing down or terminating the RMK-BRJ contract in CY 70.

Some contract capability will always be required in SVN as long as US forces are employed there. Specifically, contractors performing dredging, electric power and distribution, and mechanical construction will be required. It will be more economical to terminate the CPAF contractor and keep the speciality contractors because of the large overload involved with the RMK-BRJ contractor. Local lump sum contractors have the capability of performing about \$1.5 million of work per month.

The MILCON work remaining for troop accomplishment amounts to \$149 million broken out by Service as shown in Table 3. The military engineer work force and its assigned JCS capability for MILCON is shown in Table 4. It is interesting to note that the current troop MILCON capability is about \$5 million per month. This work placement rate represents about 20% of the total effort available for MILCON work (exclusive of LOC) and about 17% of the total military engineer effort in SVN. Table 5 shows the battalion/squadron equivalent capability by type of mission.

TABLE 3

MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION

SVN
(\$ Millions)

	Assigned Program	Work Completed	Work Remaining	% Complete
Army	223.4	118.7	104.7	53.1
Navy	95.4	58.9	36.5	61.7
Air Force	13.4	10.4	8.0	56.5
Total	337.2	188.0	149.2	55.7

SOURCE: MACV Placement SITREP dated February 28, 1969.

TABLE 4

MILITARY ENGINEER BNS/SQDNS
IN SVN

	Program 6	Assigned MILCON Missions	Monthly Unit Capability	Total Monthly <u>Capability</u>
Army				
Combat Bns	20	13	3 41,000	\$ 533,000
Construction Bns	14	. 13	\$183,000	\$2,379,000
Navy				
MCBs	10	10	\$150,000	\$1,500,000
Marine Corps		1		
Combat Bns	2	0	0	0
Force Bns	2 3	0	0	0
Air Force				
Red Horse Sqdns	5	5	\$ 80,000	\$ 400,000
Total	54	42		\$4,812,000

<sup>1/</sup> Divisional engineer battalions are excluded since their work is entirely combat support.

<sup>2/</sup> One Construction battalion converted into a land clearing Bn to support combat operations

<sup>3/</sup> The 116th Army Engineer Combat Bn (a reserve unit) is scheduled to depart SVN in September 1969.

TABLE 5
ENGINEER BN/SQDN EQUIVILENT
BY MISSION

	Operational Support 1/	LOC 2/	MILCON Base Development 3/	Non MILCON Base Development 4/	Total
Azmy					
Combat Bns ·	6.1	2.5	1.6	2.8	13.0
Construction Bns	3.5	3.1	4.1	3.3	14.0
Navy					
MCBs	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.3	10.0
		,			
Marine Corps		-			
Force Bns	.4	1.1	0	1.5	3.0
Air Force					
Red Horse Sqdns	0	0	.9	4.1 .	5.0
Total	13.0	9.0	9.0	14.0	45.0
Percentage	28.9%	20.0%	20.0%	31.1%	100%

SOURCE: Field data collected from MACVPC on March 1969 trip. Data based on information submitted to MACV during July 68 - January 69.

- 1/ Operational Support includes maintenance and construction support provided in active or projected areas of operations to assist maneuver elements, combat support elements, or immediate supporting units. Effort includes tactical bridging, assault airfields, land clearing, combat roads, etc.
- 2/ LOC includes work expended on LOCs such as national, interprovincial and local highways and railroads. It excludes on-base roads and maintenance and construction of roads in direct support of tactical operations.
- 3/ MILCON Base Development includes all Milcon projects except for LOCs.
- 4/ Non-MILCON Base Development includes all projects built with other funds (O&M, procurement, AIK, etc.).

#### FUTURE SVN REQUIREMENTS

Most of the hard core logistical requirements (i.e., ports, airfields, and depots) have been essentially completed in SVN. Current projects reflect improvements to the existing bases and fluctuating requirements in conformance to tactical operations and the shifting of troop units. Remaining uncompleted and unfunded projects concern primarily of the LOCs and support of RVNAF accelerated improvement and modernization. The LOC requirements are well identified and discussed in detail below. RVNAF construction requirements are being identified and analyzed by MACV. Some MILCON funding will be required in "VN each year to meet expected contingency requirements and to provide for base structure adjustments. Funds to be provided, however, will be limited to well defined urgent requirements and matched with the construction capability in-country.

#### Line of Communications

The land lines of communication (LOC) are in dire need of extensive restoration and improvement. Prior years of sabotage, lack of maintenance and heavy wartime traffic have virtually destroyed the road and rail networks. Reconstruction of these national assets are necessary to reduce heavy reliance on air and coastal shipping to support military operations; to improve internal security; and to assist in nation building. Prior to FY 68, the military construction program concentrated on on-base roads and largely ignored the railroads.

Now the highway emphasis is placed on the upgrading of 2,537 miles of national and interprovincial highways and city streets. This program covers minimum essential requirements to link population centers and military facilities. It does not include upgrading and new road construction required for support of combat operations in areas not served by the major road networks. Cost of this restoration is borne by a multiple funding program that includes MILCON, O&MA, AID/DOD, OPN, USAID, MAP, and GVN funds.

Railroads have received increased attention during the past year. Forty-four percent (552 km) out of a total 1240 kilometers have been restored to an operational condition. Current plans call for restoration of all rail lines from Saigon to Phu Cat plus the line between Da Nang and Hue by the end of CY 69. Funding of the Vietnamese National Railway Service (VNRS) involves both GVN piaster funding and US AID/DOD support in commodities. MILCON funding has been limited to railway spurs connecting the VNRS with US military installations. For a more complete discussion of the VNRS see August 1968 SEA Analysis Report pp. 8-15.

The road program is funded as shown in Table 6.

Additional FY 70 and FY 71 funding to complete the current approved road program are estimated by COMUSMACV to be \$79.5 million as shown in Table 7.

TABLE 6

#### ROAD FUNDING IN SVN 1/ (\$ Millions)

	FY 67 & Prior		FY 68	FY 69	Total
MILCON	24.7		28.6	33.8	87.1
OSMA	8.6		76.0	19.8	104.4
OPN .	2.2		16.0	14.8	27.0
AID/DOD	25.6		21.3	23.1	70.0
USAID	0	,	9.8.	3.4	13.2
MAP	<u>7.0</u>	•	0	0	7.0
Total	68.1	•	145.7	94.9	308.7

SOURCE: Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Raview) HQ MACV dated March 1, 1969.

1/ DOD assumed responsibility for major repair and upgrading of key GVN roads on 1 July 1966 since the GVN lacked the resources to fulfill this responsibility. Maintenance of the highways is a GVN responsibility.

#### TABLE 7

## ADDITIONAL ROAD FUNDS REQUIRED (\$ Millions)

Fund Source	PY 70	FY 71	Total
MILCON	. 25.8 <u>1</u> /	4.5	30.3
O&MA	13.6	0	13.6
OPN	5.3	0	5.3
AID/DOD .	22.2	0	22.2
USAID	3.5	5.0	8.5
Total	70.4	9.5	79.9

<sup>1/</sup> No MILCON funding is being requested for SEA in FY 70. This action reduces the available funding for road upgrading and restoration to \$49.1 million in FY 70.

As of the end CY 68 about 500 miles (19.7%) of highways had been restored to MACV standards. Another 500 miles are presently under construction by a combination of troop-contractor effort. The CY 69 goal calls for completion of 750 miles of roads so that by the end of this year, 49.3% of the road program will be completed. Final completion of the current road program is scheduled for end CY 71.

Five classes of roads are being constructed under the current program. Four-lane highways are to be built where traffic is heavy (over 6000 vehicles per day). Lesser standards are provided for traffic at various traffic densities as shown in Table 8.

#### TADILE 8

#### LOC STANDARDS

•	Miles	Traffic Density
4-Lane	15	Heavy (over 6000 per day)
Class A (24° paved roadway with 8° shoulders)	1,097	Heavy (under 6000 per day)
Class B (20' roadway with 8' shoulders)	931	Heavy (under 6000 per day)
Class C (20' roadway with 5' shoulders)	495.	Medium (limited two-way traffic)
Class D (15' roadway with 5' shoulders)	0	Light (one-way traffic)
Total	2,537	

Expansion of the road program to include secondary roads to province, district and hamlet levels would add about 18,000 miles of class Cand D roads to the program. These roads, though not presently considered or approved by MACV, are receiving increased attention in SVN as the major highways are being completed.

#### Summary

Essential construction requirements for our forces in SEA have been largely provided for. Future programs will be limited to high priority requirements and funded at levels that can be completed within a year after funds are made available. Some construction will be required as long as the US maintains forces in SEA. After termination of the SVN conflict, additional requirements may develop as our post-Vietnam force and stationing posture is approved.

#### CARGO DISCHARGE CAPABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS OF U. S. MILITARY PORTS IN SYN

The attached Table summarizes the cargo discharged at all SVN U. S. Military Ports from August, 1965, to December, 1966, and presents the MACV forecast of capability and the OASD(I&L) forecast of requirements through August, 1967.

In view of the number of factors which can affect actual performance (weather, peaks and valleys in ship arrivals, equipment, cargo outload workload, tactical emergencies), the computed "Reserve" capability cannot at this time be equated to Excess" capability.

Nevertheless, in at least 7 of the last 18 weeks in 1966, there was insufficient cargo at Danang to fully utilize available rescurces and a similar situation may develop in the future at other ports. The following Table summarizes workload data at Danang for the last four months of CY, 1966, the period during which the worst of the Northeast Monsoons occurs.

Week Ending	Week Disch Capability (M/T)	Week Actual Discharge (M/T)	DANANG 1/ Total cargo in port end of week (M/T)	Backlog in terms of Capability (Days)
9/3/66 9/10/66	59,500 50,400	47,906 25,303*	15,833 7,990	1.9 1.1
9/17/66	44,100	27,519*	27,569	4.4
9/24/66	44.100	30,117*	25,136	4.0
10/1/66	44,100	34,856	11,116	1.8
10/8/66	51,550	27,896	24,896	3.4
10/15/66	51,450	40,320	46,934	6.4
10/22/66	51,450	51,707	38,479	5.2 4.8
10/29/66	51,450 <i>6</i> 4,050	48,424 54,651	35,507 33,819	
11/5/66 11/12/66	64,050	36,856	23,449	3.7 2.6
11/19/66	64,050	28,501	37,162	4.1
11/26/66	64,050	23,902*	39,632	4.3
12/3/66	64,050	25,397*	71,388	7.8
12/10/66	71,400	51,468	46,547	4.6
12/17/66	71,400	58,190	33,968	3.3
12/24/66	71,400	43,940*	6,607	.6
12/31/66	71,400	13,509*	22,036	2.2

<sup>1/</sup> Data from SEA Stat. Summ. Tables 610, 613.

Note. COMUSMACV is currently forecasting Danang April, 1967 discharge capability as 88,200 M/T per week.

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<sup>\*</sup> Low total discharge identified by COMUSMACV as due to inadequate cargo available for discharge.

After a longer period of experience, COMUSMACV should be requested to identify resources excess to requirements, plus reasonable contingency or surge reserves, and either to reallocate them within SVN or nominate them for withdrawal. The resources that should be evaluated include lighterage, equipment and contractor/military personnel.

OASD(SA)/SEA Programs Division is in the process of cataloging the cargo handling resources of each major port complex in order to develop the capability to assess productivity rates and identify apparent shortages or excesses.

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## TOTAL CARGO DISCHARGE BY U.S. MILITARY ALL SVN PORTS (000 Short Tons)

Month	1/ Discharged	2/ Capability	3/ Requirements	Computed Reserve Capability
Actual 1965 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec	164 280 248 238 226			
1966 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec	364 358 455 418 448 526 611 (25)* 649 (37)* 659 (48)* 661 (53)* 626 (54)* 713 (36)*			
Forecast 1967 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug		825 (85)* 915 (85)* 970 (85)* 1005(100)* 1060(100)* 1105(100)* 1160(100)* 1205(100)*	790 (85)* 800 (85)* 800 (85)* 835(100)* 835(100)* 840(100)* 850(100)*	35 115 170 170 225 265 310 350

- 1/ Data furnished by SASM.
- 2/ COMUSMACV Port Capability Forecasts.
- 3/ OASD(I&L) requirements forecast.
- \* All figures in parentheses are amount of ATD cargo discharged by U.S. military included in total figures.

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#### OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The attached Table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to December, 1966, and presents the OASD(I&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

OASD(I&L) and OASD(SA) believe that the forecasted tonnage for CY 1967 is probably a maximum since the experience base used for projection includes a substantial volume of non-recurring shipments for purposes such as construction, establishment of initial levels of supply, contractor mobilization and a number of special project shipments. As soon as the major non-recurring shipments can be quantified the forecast will be revised.

The present level of MSTS ships (including 142 NDRF ships in service and 19 NDRF ships in the process of activation) should be adequate to meet the requirements presently forecasted. The unbooked cargo for SEA is below the 100,000 M/T considered optimum for ship scheduling and efficient ship utilization and ship turnaround time should be reduced as the weather improves and port capability in SVN increases. Earring unforeseen contingencies, it is unlikely that the 20 addi 'onal NDRF ships included in the 67 Supplemental (\$11 million) will have to be activated. The same view was presented by the MSTS representative at the December 21, 1366, Joint Transportation Board meeting. MSTS stated that although the MSTS long-range forecast showed a 6 - 10 cargo ship deficit each month for the period March through July, 1967, they recommended no additional breakouts since such a deficit would be manageable.

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MSTS OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM COMUS TO SEA

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MONTH	A	LL SOUT	h vietnam p	orts		TOTAL ALL OTHER	GRAND TOTAL	UNBOOKED CARGO CONUS
2/		Ammo	Aircraft	Other	Total	SEA DESTINATIONS	SEA	TO ALL SEA DESTINATION
Actual							<del></del>	
1965								` .
Aug	197	23	83 4	145	443	116	564	
Sep	99	22		209	334	144	478	
Oct	17%	121	21 64	274	590	255	845	
Nov-	52 24	62	64	251	429	370	799	•
Dec	24	10		207	241	275	516	
1966								
Jan	14	48	16	213	291	251	542	16
Feb	23 33 4	48 36 93 72 46	16 6	418	29 <b>1</b> 483	296	779	45
Mar	33	93	31 4	425	532	380	962	16
Apr	4	72	4	395	475	332	807	· 84
May	57 46		20	372	495	33 <sup>1</sup> +	829	235
Jun	46	94	23	452	615	<b>1</b> 1011	1019	213
Jul	79	80	40	382	581	339	320	234
Aug	126	92	14	547	779	598	1377	298 162
Sep	205	94 80 92 83 83	17 16	368	673	396	1069	168
Oct	129	83	16	452	680	427	1107	Ę6
Nov	133 89	105	3	59h	835	504	1339	63 87
Dec	, 89	119	7	469	634	317	1001 (*)	87
Forecast	,							
1967								
Jan					826	50',	1335	
Feb	•				839	512	1351	
Mar					£ <del>'</del> 40	516	1356	
Apr					268	510	1378	
May					867	510	1377	
Jun					871	510	1381	
Jul					863	517	1400	
Aug					867 871 883 898 886	513	1411	
Sep					886	513	1399	
Oct					907	513	1420	
Nov					906	513	1419	
Dec					908	513	1421	

1/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii.

OASD(T&L) forecast (includes AID-CPA military name cargo).
 (a) December 1966, decline attributable in part to weekly aggregations and in part to temporary restrictions on cargo shipments to Cam Ranh, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon because of port congestion and Saigon because of strike. Total cargo withheld by CINCPAC (PAMPA) estimated as 70,000 M/T.

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<sup>2/</sup> Data from MIMIS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments data furnished by SASM. MIMIS data maintained on weekly basis. Monthly totals by aggregation of 4 weekly periods results in some distortion of actual monthly totals. Subsequent editions this Table will be adjusted to eliminate aggregation distortions.
3/ OASD(I&L) forecast (includes AID-CPA military handled cargo).

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#### SHIP FLOW (TURNAROUND TIME) IN SVN

As the attached Table shows, the input of shipping into SVN from October to December, 1966, was the highest of any quarter to date. During the same period, however, despite record numbers of ship completions and departures, the average length of time spent in SVN and SEA Holding Ports increased. The significant increase occurred in November which had an average of 22.2 days. This was slightly higher than the 21.9 days experienced in November, 1965, but significantly lower than the all-time peak of 35.4 days experienced in January, 1966. The December, 1966, rate of 19 days shows a 3.2 day improvement over November, 1966.

A major cause of the increased turnaround time during November, 1966, was the inability of Cam Ranh Bay (and to a lesser extent Qui Nhon) to achieve its forecasted discharge rates. The following summarizes the performance of the two ports during the period 30 October to 3 December 1966.

Week Ending	CAM I	RANH BAY harged/Da		QUI NHON S/T Discharged/Day
11/5/66 11/12/66 11/19/66 11/26/66 12/3/66	6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 4,220*	Actual 3,286 3,778 4,847 4,312 3,984	(%) 55 63 81 72 94	Capacity     Actual     (%)       3,550     2,277     64       3,550     2,941     83       3,550     3,574     101       3,550     2,227     63       3,240*     2,670     82

<sup>\*</sup>Revised COMUSMACV capability forecast

The following summarizes the substantial reductions which have occurred in COMPSMACV's forecasts of the capability for discharge at Cam Renh Bay.

	CAM RANH BAY		
	S/T per day	S/T per day	4
Performance Mouth	Original Forecasta/	Latest Revised Forecast	Reduction
December, 1966	6,000	4,220	30
January, 1967	7,600	4.100	46
February, 1967	7,600	5,200	32
March, 1967	7,570	5,200	31

a/ Made 4 months prior to forecasted month.

A combination of factors including weather, shortages of Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) and diversion of personnel to Vung Ro have been identified by COMUSMACV as factors responsible for Cam Ranh's current problems. However, indications are that depot receiving capability may be a principal problem. The Joint Transportation Board has tasked SASM to determine what actions are necessary to improve Cam Ranh Bay's cargo handling performance. In addition, the Department of the Army has been requested by COMISMACV and CINCPAC to expedite production and shipment of MHE.

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### SHIP FLOW (TURNAROUND TIME) IN SVN (Cont'a)

Since the COMUSMACV capability forecasts control the amount of cargo which is released from CONUS and the off-share bases into SVN, if the reductions in capability could have been perceived and communicated to shipping control agencies earlier for the months of November and December, greater shipping efficiency would have been achieved. At an average cost of \$4,000 per day for each ship in SVN, the increase in the average number of days in SVN between October and November, 1966, resulted in increased costs of approximately \$2.4 million and adversely affected the timely return of shipping to CONUS for reloading.

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## MSTS DEEP DRAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

	1965 <u>Ju1</u>	Aug	Sep	<u>Oet</u>	Nov	Dec	1966 <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	Mar	Apr
No. of ships arriving in SVN		78	87	86	77	60	87	63	92	106
No. of ships departing in SVN	36	5 <b>7</b>	72	72	70	62	107	76	92	94
No. of ships in SVN at E.O.M.	16	37	52	66	73	71	51	38	38	50
No. of ships in SEA Holding Ports at E.O.M.			2		21	21	2			2

<sup>1/</sup> Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express Amno

	<u>ANALYSIS O</u>	F TIME	SPENT BY	MSTS	CARGO	SHIPS IN	SVN AND	HOLDING	AREAS	<u>1</u> / -
	1965 Jul	Aug	Sep	<u>Oct</u>	Nov	Dec	1966 <u>Jan</u>	Feb	Mar	Apr
No. of ships	<u> 36</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>72</u>	70	62	107	<u>76</u>	92	94
Avg No. of day in SVN2:/	8,6	10.6	12.8	18.6	21.2	29.1	30.5	20	14.8	11.7
Avg No. of day in SEA Holdin Ports		<del></del>		.2		2.2	4.9	7.3	1.3	
Total Avg No. days	of 8.6	10.6	12.8	1.8.8	21.9	31.3	35.4	27.3	16.1	31.7

<sup>1/</sup> Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes storage ships.

water to a day there.

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1966		CONFIDENTIAL										
Jan Feb Mar	Apr	May	Jun	<u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec			
87	63	92	106	91.	105	-98	113	98	148	99	139	
107	76	92	<b>3</b> t	88	9€	104	106	109	115	119	132	
107 51	38	38	50	53	62	56	63	52	85	65	72	
2			2	1.2	12	1.2	3	n	3	9	8	

Force Special Express Armo ships and floating storage ships.

		HOLDING	;	<u>1</u> /
BVN	AND	HOLDING	AREAS	
£.				•
9	~			

1966 <u>Jan</u>	Feb	Mar	- 'pr	May	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	<u>Oct</u>	Nov	<u>Dec</u>
107	<u>76</u>	92	<u>94</u>	88	· <u>%</u>	104	106	109	115	119	132
30.5	20	14.8	11.7	14.7	15.9	16.8	14.7	15.6	15.1	20.2	17.0
4.9	7.3	1.3		8	2.3	2.8	2,9	3.0	2.1	Nov 119 20.2 2.0	2.0
35.4	27.3	16.1	11.7	15.5	18.2	19.6	17.6	18.6	17.2	55•5	19.0

ting during month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating

iling time between SVN ports.

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Feb-67

#### OCEAN CARGO SHIFTS LIS FROM COMUS TO SEA.

The attached Table suscerizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SMA for the period August, 1955, to January, 1957, and presents the revised OASD(IBL) forecast of shighents through December, 1967.

The revised forecast represents approximately a 200,000 M/T monthly reduction from previous forecasts and is based on evidence that the heavy build-up phase, particularly in the off-shore bases, has passed and that the great proportion of material shipped in the future will be resupply for replacement of consumption. Another factor which will result in reductions in shipments to the off-shore bases is the Army plan to reduce the use of Ckinewa for logistic support of SVN. In the first half of CY 1965 Army shipments to Okinewa totalled 192,000 M/T; in the last half of CY 1966 these shipments totalled 610,000 M/T. Direct shipment from CONUS to SVN of much of this tonnage, eliminating transshipment through Okinewa, should have negligible effect on the total tonnage handled by the SVN ports.

The increase in unbooked cargo in January to 133,000 M/T was due primarily to actions taken to temporarily reduce shipments from COMUS to Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon because of port congestion. These restrictions were relaxed in early February, resulting in a surge of shipments.


Barring unforeseen contingencies, no further IPRF ship activations should be necessary.

Cargo flow forecasting is subject to a large number of variables, not the least important of which are the essentially decentralized requisitioning systems and the inability to predict requirements under combat conditions. Hevertheless, reasonable accuracy in the forecasting of gross requirements can be achieved by the use of factors applied against in-country force levels and planned deployments. CINCPAC has developed a computer model to do this and it is now operational. Based on the forces to be supported by each port, the model predicts total port throughput requirements separately for  $\hat{\theta}$  SVN ports and each of the off-shore bases. The tonnages are forecasted for 8 major categories of requirements; i.e., supply build-up, resupply, construction material, special projects, MAP, AID, unit equipment and air munitions. The model applies different factors as appropriate to forces of each Service and has the capability to vary the Services factors by geographic location. The CENCPAC model is a valuable addition to the tools available to logistic planners and strongly merits continued resources support to improve its capabilities. Factors must be further refined to reflect the unique consumption rates being experienced in the SVN environment and transportation management data reporting systems throughout DCD require modifications to facilitat, analysis of variances between forecast and actual,

(000 M/C)

	ALL SOUTH VIETUAL FORTS						ALL OTHER SEA DEST	
монтн	Unit Equip	Ammo	Aircraft .	Other	Total	Jan '67 Forecast	Total	Jan Fore
1965	•							-
Aug	211	23	83	171	488		128	z
Sep	130	44	4	553	407		163 243	
Oct	129	108	24	248	509	į	243	
Nov	47	50	47	209	353 284 -		316 308	
Dec	28	13	13	230	284 -	•	308	
1966		_	•			1		
Jan	19	51 35 86 76 46	16	250	346	į	284	
Feb	21	<b>3</b> 5	10	402	468	Į	262	
Mar	28	86	25	376 424	515	İ	339	
Apr	7	76	6	424	513	į	352 363	
May	57	46	20	398 404	521		363	
June	43	92 94	51	1:04	560	1	347	
July	87	84	42	419	632		393	
Aug	115	88	14	476	693	1	520	
Sep	210	83	17	415	722		439	
Oct	139	90	18	518	765	1	485	
Nov	120	94	2 8	451	707		416	
Dec	94	125	8	514	741		352	
1967							_	37-
Jan	67	93	29	570	759	745	382	37-
Feb		• •				753 763		37∉ 38≎
Mar						763		<b>3</b> 8∂
Apr						770		375
May						784		375
June						796		37:
July						810		351
Aug						825		375 375 351 377 377 374 374
Sep						835		37.7
Oct						853	•	37
lov						850		3.*
Dec						870		
						•		

SEA defined to include all ports west of Haveli. Actual data from MIMIS adjusted to include ALE SASM. Forecast data from OASD(I&L).



MOTE COPAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FIRST COINS TO 1-: 1: (000 M/T)

ALL	SOU	TH	ME	PO	323

			m bcom (2.73.	1727 1 02120	
HTROM	Unit Equip	Armo	Aircraft	Other	Total
1965 Aug Sep	211 130	74 23	83 4	171 229	488 407
Oct Nov . Dec	129 47 28	108 50 13	24 47 13	248 209 230	509 353 284
1966 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jure July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec	19 21 28 7 57 43 87 115 210 139 120 94	51 35, 76 46 98 88 83 99 125	16 10 25 6 20 21 42 14 17 18 2 8	260 402 376 424 398 404 419 412 518 491	346 468 515 513 521 560 632 693 722 765 707 741
1957 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec	67	93		570	<b>7</b> 59

a/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual date SASM. Forecast data from CASD(I&L).

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
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			SOM INFIALIW	•			
ALL OTHER	SEA DESTINATIONS	GRAID T	OTAL SEA	UNBOOKED CARGO CONUS			
	Jun 1.7		Jar 167				
Total	Porcenst.	Actual	Forecast	TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS			
	1			}			
				ĺ			
123		616					
163	I	. 570					
243		752					
316		669					
308	<b>i</b>	592					
500	l	<b>77</b>		ŧ.			
284		630		16			
262		. <b>7</b> 30		45			
339		854		16			
352		865		84			
363		884	<b>:.</b>	235			
347		907		213 234			
393		1025		1 000 .			
520		1213		162			
439		1161		66			
3		3250- 1123		63			
		1103	•	87			
•		1100		-			
-							
382	374	1141	1119	133			
<del>"</del>	376		1759				
	380		1143	1			
	375		1145				
	375		1159				
	375		1171	1			
	381		1191				
	377		1505	į.			
	377 276	1	1553 1515	1			
	376 376	1	1552	•			
	375 275	l	1246	1			
	<u> </u>	1	ac-ro	,			
		l		1			

adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo snipments data furnished by

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. February 13, 1567

SHIP FLOW (TURNAROUND TIME) IN SYN.



As the attached Table shows, January was the second consecutive month in which the average number of days spent by ships in SVN and SEA holding ports decreased. The average of 18.5 days compares favorably with the most recent peak of 22.2 days which occurred in November, 1966. The 138 ships completed during January was the highest monthly total achieved to date in SVN.

Continued improvement can be expected from better weather and a policy change by COM'SMACV. He has directed that ships with minimum levels of cargo remaining o: ard (1,000 M/T of ammunition or 1,500 M/T of general cargo) will be give the highest discharge priority. This should eliminate the uneconomical practice of holding ships in SVN ports with remnant or other low priority cargo remaining on board.

The progress made in cargo operations in SVN can be appreciated by comparing performance in January, 1967, with January, 1966.

	January 1966	January 1967
Total cargo discharged (CCO M/T) Total cargo backleaded (CCO M/T)	749 · <u>121</u>	1,170 291
Total cargo handled (000 M/T)	870	1,461
Total average number of days of ships in SVN and SEA Holding Ports*	35.4	18.5

\*based on ships departing foring month and excluding Air Force Special Express Asmo ships and floating storage ships.

MSTS DEEP DRAFF CAPOD SHIP FLOW THEAUTH SVN

•	1965 <u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nev	<u>Dec</u>	1966 <u>Jan</u>	Feb	Mar
No. of ships arriving in SVN		78	87	86	77	<i>6</i> 0	87	63	92
No. of ships departing in SVN	36	57	72	72	70	6 <u>2</u> .	107	76	92
No. of ships in SVN at E.O.M.	16	37	52	66	73	71	51.	38	38
No. of ships in SEA Holding Ports at F.O.M.	/	<i></i>	2	;	21 -	21	2		

<sup>1/</sup> Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express A

<u>.</u>	nalysis of	TIME	SPERT BY	MSTS	CARGO SI	HIPS IN	SVN AID	HOLDI	IG AREAS	<u></u>
	1.965 Jul	Aug	Sep	<u>Oct</u>	llov	<u>Dec</u>	1966 <u>Jan</u>	Feb	Mar	more an esservice per constraints
No. of ships	<u> 36</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>70</u>	62	107	<u>76</u>	<u>92</u> ,	<b>S</b>
Avg No. of days	8.6	10.6	12.8	18.6	21.2	29.1	30.5	20	14.8	11.
Avg No. of days in SEA Holding Ports		********		2	7	2.2	4.9	7.3	1.3	A CONTRACTOR STATE OF THE STATE
Total Avg No. o	of 8.6	10.6	12.8	18.8	21.9	31.3	35.4	27.3	16.1	11.7

<sup>1/</sup> Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excluding storage ships.

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<sup>2/</sup> Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN por

			1956					CON				
<u> </u>	<u>Fov</u>	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	<u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct
	77	60	87	62	92	106	91	105	98	113	98	148
	70	62	107	.76	92	94	88	96	104	106	109	115
<del>-</del>	73 .	71	51	38	38	50	53	62	56	63	52	85
	21	21	2			2	12	12	12	3	11,	3

Excludes Air Force Special Express Armo ship, and floating storage ships.

## THE SHIPS IN SVN AND HOLDING AREAS

	IIV	<u>Dec</u>	1966 <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Cct	
	2	<u>62</u>	107	<u>76</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>94</u>	88	<u>96</u>	104	106	109	115	
···	三.2	29.1	30.5	50	14.8	11.7	14.7	15.9	16.8	3.4.7	15.6	15.1	
		2.2	4.9	7.3	1.3	*	<u>8.</u>	2.3	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.1	
.:	至.9	31.3	35.4	27.3	16.1	11.7	15.5	18.2	19.6	17.6	18.6	17.2	

Things departing during month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and it.

----- in SVW. sailing time between SVW ports,

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					TIAL"	NFIDEN	CO				· ·
1967 Jan	Dec	Nov	Cet	545	<u> 4:18</u>	Jul.	<u>रू</u> /गा	May	Apr	Mar	<u>r. i.</u>
123	139	. 99	148	98	113	.98	1.05	91	106	92	63
138	132	119	115	109	106	104	96	88	94	92	76
57	. 72	65	85	52	63	56	62	53	50	38	38
7	В	o	2	11	3	12	12	12	2		

ecial Express Armo ships and floating storage ships.

OIDI	NG AREA	<u>1</u> /			·			;	-		
Fe	· ·	Apr	May	<u>Jun</u>	. <u>Jul</u> .	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	1967 <u>Jan</u>
<u>76</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>26</u>	104	106	109	115	119	132	138
D ST. A.C.	14.8	11.7	14.7	15.9	16.8	14.7	15.6	15.1	20.2	17.0	16.6
7.3	1.3		8	2.3	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9
7.3	16.1	11.7	15.5	18.2	19.6	17.6	18.5	17.2	35√5	19.0	18.5

ing month. Excludes Air Force Special Express Armo ships and floating


between SVN ports.

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#### SHIP FLOW (TURNAROUND TIME) IN SVN



As the attached Table shows, February was the third consecutive month in which the average number of days spent by ships in SVN and SEA holding ports decreased. The average of 16.1 days was the lowest since May 1966 (15.5 days) and was 11.2 days lower than February 1966. The significance of the reduction over a year ago is that if it had not been achieved, ship demurrage charges in February 1967 would have been approximately \$5.7 million higher (average of \$4,000 per ship day of delay).

The interim goal for average days should be 10 days since current MSTS chipping contracts provide for 10 days agreed "lay time" (discharge/delay time) without additional charges. Any subsequent improvements could result in reduction of the agreed lay time and commensurate reductions in shipping costs to the Government.

The number of ships in SVN ports at the end of the month was 54; this is only 3 in excess of the current MACV prescribed optimum of 51. The optimum level is computed on the basis of port capability and the ship flow necessary to maintain maximum cargo discharge rates. However, under-utilization of some ports and over-commitment of others can be expected on the basis of cargo generation patterns and port operation experience to date.

MSTS DEEP DRAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

	1965 <u>Jui</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	<u>Dec</u>	1966 <u>Jan</u>	Feb	Har	Apr
No. of ships arriving in SVN		78	87	86	77	60	87	63	92	106
No. of ships departing in SVN	36	57	72	72	70	62	107	76	92	έγ <del>λ</del>
No. of ships in SVN at E.O.M.	16	37	52	66	73	71	51.	38	38	50
No. of ships in SEA Holding Ports at E.O.M.			2		<b>2</b> I	21	2			2

Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express Amno

;	ANALYSIS OF	TIME	SPETT B	Y MSTS	CARGO	SHIPS IN	SVN AND	HOLDIN	G AREAS	¥/
	1965 <u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	<u>Dec</u>	1966 <u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	Mar	<u> Aor</u>
No. of ships	<u> 36</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>70</u>	62	107	<u>76</u>	92	94
Avg No. of day in SVN2/	8.6	10.6	12.8	18.6	21.2	29.1	30.5	20	14.8	11.7
Avg No. of day in SEA Holdin Ports			**********	2	7	2.2	4.9	<u>_7.3</u>	1.3	<del></del>
Total Avg No. days	of 8.6	10.6	12.8	18.8	21.9	31.3	35.4	27.3	16.1	11.7

<sup>1/</sup> Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes storage ships.

<sup>2/</sup> Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN ports to the contract of the

Feb 63 76 38 Special		<b>Y</b>										0
				CON	FIDENT	IJAL .					1967	
Feb	Mar	<u>Apr</u>	May	Jun	<u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	<u>Jan</u>	Feb
63	92	106	91	105	98	113	98	148	99	139	123	125
76	92	94	88	96	104	106	109	115	119	132	138	128
38	38 ្	50	53	62	56	63	52	85	65	72	57	54
		2	12	12	12	3	1.1.	3	9	8	7	6
Special	Express	Ammo	ships a	nd floa	ting st	orage s	hips.		;			
•		<u>1</u> /				·						

EANT)	HOLDING	ARFAS
21111	710707710	224122

66	Feb	Mar	Apr	<u>May</u>	Jun	<u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	<u>Oct</u>	Nov	Dec	1967 <u>Jan</u>	Feb
7	<u>76</u>	92	94	88	<u>96</u>	104	106	109	115	119	132	138	128
5	20	14.8	11.7	14.7	15.9	16.8	14.7	15.6	15.1	20.2	17.0	16.6	14.4
<u>.9</u>	7.3	1.3	-	8	2.3	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.7
	27.3	16.1	11.7	15.5	18.2	19.6	17.6	18.6	17.2	22.2	19.0	18.5	16.1

during month. Exeludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and floating

ing time between SVN ports.

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#### SAIGON PORT

#### Background

The rate of discharge and movement of cargo through the port of Saigon is critical to ensuring that the supply of civilian goods is adequate to control inflation, since approximately 90% of all non-military cargo enters SVN through Saigon. The attached Chart shows the tonnage handled by the port, on a monthly basis, since September 1965.

The capability of the port to handle cargo has increased from approximately 287,000 short tons of cargo a month to over 450,000 tons since July 1965. Of the current total approximately 45% is U.S. military cargo. As the Chart shows, the key problem is discharge of the commercial/AID cargo, not the military cargo.

#### December Crisis

The commercial/ATD cargo sector of the port reached a crisis point in December 1966, when the discharge fell to a record low of 102,000 S/T and the backlog soared to a record high of 311,000 S/T. This was due to several factors:

- (1) There was a strike against the port by Vietnamese longshoremen over the decision to operate Newport with U. S. military instead of Vietnamese stevedores.
- (2) The limited in-transit storage facilities were saturated by goods since importers were not taking delivery. This situation was a manifestation of market congestion, rather than port congestion, resulting from the heavy imports during the preceding months. Import licensing in FY 1966, peaking late in the year, totalled \$494.7 million as compared to \$239.5 million in FY 1965.
- (3) The then incumbent GVN Port Director (who was replaced in January) experimented, contrary to U.S. advice, with discharging parges at deep draft berths with the result that not only did the deep draft tonnage discharge decline sharply but also the staging areas became further congested with cargo which the importers either would not or could not pick up.

#### Remedies

The drastic drop-off in discharge performance in December made it apparent that the entire problems was in langer of becoming paralyzed. To correct the situation a number of actions were taken -- some of which previously had been recommended by MACV and USAID but were not agreed to by the GVN. Actions taken included:

- (1) Improved responsiveness by the GVN Port Authority to U.S. advice.
- (2) Active U.S. military participation in barge discharge operations at one of the principal sites, Block 22 on the Kinh Te Canal (Map attached). Specific barges are being called forward by the GVN Port Authority for discharge and consignees are being notified in advance of cargo arrivals by USAID Importer Contact Teams. USAID continues its actions to ensure that the consignees accept their cargo and remove it from the port area. As part of the operation, the U.S. military provides personnel to document all cargo discharged from barges and prepares inventories of all cargo in transit storage at Block 22.
- (3) Bulk commodities are being pre-cleared through GVN Customs based on barge manifests which permits discharge at improvised sites along the extensive Saigon canal system.
- (4) Pressures are being exerted to discharge general cargo at alongside berths and restrict the use of barges as much as possible to bulk commodities. This should help to minimize mixed consignee loads in the barges which delays and complicates port clearance and acceptance by importers.
- (5) MACV is discharging additional commodities designated by USATD, principally fertilizer, to relieve the workload of the commercial port.
- (6) Construction of additional barge facilities and warehousing is being expedited, principally along the Kinh Te Cana. and at Thu Duc. The Thu Duc facility is now partially in use and is expected to be fully operational in April 1967. It will have double the capability of existing Saigon in-transit storage facilities.
- (7) The GVN has implemented a new port tariff which acts as an incentive for importers to take delivery of their cargo. The previous unrealistically low charges encouraged leaving cargo in barges and scarce in-transit storage as cheap warehousing. (The still missing action is confiscation of goods left in the port over specified maximum time.)
- (8) MACV is inventorying the Sargon barge fleet and monitoring the barge turnaround rate (Chart attached). The inventory has not yet been completed because of the problem of locating and identifying the many barges constantly moving in the port and the canals
- (9) USAID is constructing warehouses at Nha Trang and Danang on order to permit cargoes to be discharged and distributed directly from up-country ports to avoid 'mposing the burden on the already over-committed Saigon port.

#### Recent Performance

The results achieved to date by the above-described actions can test be measured by comparison of data for the latest three months (December, 1966 - February, 1967) with the previous three month period (September - November, 1966).

## SAIGON PORT - COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO DISCHARGED (Short Tons)

	Sep -	Nov 1966	5		Dec 1966 - Feb 1				
Sep	Disch 191,000	Daily Avg 6,367	Backlog EOM 162,000	De T	Disch 102,000	Daily Avg 3,290 8,613	Backlog <u>EOM</u> 311,000 264,000		
Oct Nov Mo Avg	215,000 244,000 216,700	6,935 8,133 7,145	222,000	Je i Feb Mo Avg	267,000 199,000 189,300	8,652* 6,851	171,000		

Mo Avg Excl
Dec 233,000 8,633

\*Feb. computed on 23-day month because of TET (8-12 Feb).

The February 1967, performance should be interpreted in the light of the occurrence of TET (8-12 Feb) during which the Vietnamese did not work the port. If the port had worked during TET and February had been a full 30 day month (assuming the same daily average discharge rate of 8,652 tons had been maintained), the trial tonnage discharged would have been 260,000 S/T and the backlog would have been down to about 110,000 tons. While the actual February backlog of 171,000 tons was the lowest since September 1966, the following Table demonstrates that a major cause was the lowest input of new cargo since before May of 1966:

## Saigou Fort Commercial/Aid Cargo Input - Output Analysis (000 Short Tons)

	Month	Beginning Backlog	Arrivals during menth 1/	Total Avail. Cargo	Discharged	Ending Backlog
1966	May *	101	164	265	179	86
_	June	86	· 235	321	198	123
	Jul	123	293	416	235	181
	Aug	181	264	445	249	196
	Sep	$1^{r}$ .	157	353	191	162
	Oct	160	275	437	215	553
	Nov	555	231	453	244	209
	Dec	209	204	413	105	311
1967	Jan Feb	311 264	220 106	531 370	267 199	264 171

Arrivals a computed rather than reported figure.No backlog data available prior April 1966.


It should also be noted, however, that the backlog of loaded barges at the end of February was the highest since records have been maintained. Unless the barges can be turned around faster, ship discharge will bog down again.


#### Future Prospects

On balance, the precipitous decline in discharge that occurred in December has been reversed and pre-December productivity restored. The January to February decline in backlog was due almost entirely to the abnormally low input of new cargo. Lacking a mechanism to control the flow of commercial/AID cargo into SVN, no meaningful forecasts can be made of the future levels of monthly cargo arrivals and resulting backlogs. However, there has been an approximately \$90 million decline in the import licenses issued during the 1st half of FY 1967; the effects of this should be felt over the next 6 months. While the port is obviously still congested, particularly the barges with over-age cargo still on-board, even undelivered cargoes serve a useful purpose as they exert a downward pressure on prices. Their presence in the port discourages hoarding and market speculation.

Over the longer run the outlook for the port is favorable due to the accelerated construction programs, the beginning of improved GVN management and cooperation, the stronger "operational" roles of MACV and USAID, and the increased utilization of up-country ports.

In view of the Saigon port problems, of incidental interest is a March 6, 1967, message from CCMUSMACTHAI describing port of Bangkok congestion which now causes ships to wait approximately 12 days for a berth (an average of 26 ships waiting at any one time). COMUSMACTHAI states Bangkok's problems in similar terms as the Saigon experience—inadequate port clearance capability which affects berthtime, barge discharge and over-all port throughput. While MACTHAI believes U.S. military shipping delays will be eliminated as Sattahip becomes operational, he expects commercial shipping congestion will continue to be a problem for an indeterminate period.






## SAIGON BARGE REPORT


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- ( \* ) DATA NOT AVAILABLE
- (\*\*) REPORTING PERIOD CHANGED TO IO DAY PERIODS

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


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## SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG



\* GVN BACKLOG FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE


## BACKLOG

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CPA/CIP AID CARGO U.S. MIL BACKLOG

U.S. MIL. CARGO BACKLOG



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#### OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The Table on the following page summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August 1965 to March 1967, and presents the OASD (I&L) forecast of shipments through December 1967.

Total SEA shipments reached a new high of 1,289,000 M/T in March, up 129,000 M/T over February, and 13% greater than forecast. Most of the increase was in cargo to other than SVN ports. Non-SVN shipments totaled 493,000 M/T, up 109,000 M/T from February and 30% greater than the forecast. A closer look at non-SVN shipments in the light of shipments during the previous 14 months, shows that the cargo was distributed as follows:

(000 m/m)	MSTS CONUS	Destinations a/		
(OOO M/T) Destination	Jan-Jun 1966 Monthly Ave.	Jul-Dec 1966 Monthly Ave,	Jan-Feb 1967 Monthly Ave.	March 1967 b/
Thailand	35.4	58.8	58.6	,7.0
Philippines	114.0	117.2	56.9	59.2
Guam	23.7	35.1	50.8	49.3
Okinawa	90.0	98.8	50.8 86.9	138.0
Japan	61.3	76.7		93.7
Korea	63.0	63.8	66.4	69.0
Taiwan	12.0	13.3	67.9 66.4 14.7	9.8
<b>Total</b>	402 <b>.</b> 6	463.6	402.2	493.0

a/ Source: MSTS Report RVN Sealist Digest, February 1967
b/ Source: OASD (I&L), interpolated from MTMTS - TI-4 Report for March 1967.

The greatest increases in March were into Thailand and Okincwa with about 50 per cent each. The increase into Thailand was probably due in part to air ordnance for the B-52s that deployed to U-Tapao in early April. There are no apparent reasons for the sharp and surprising increase in Okinawa tonnages. Further investigation into Okinawa shipments will be made in light of the decision by the Secretary of Defense in December to restrict the role of Okinawa in the Army's PACOM logistic system. In view of the reduced role to be played by the Okinawa depots, reduction in shipments should be occurring.

Shipments to Vietnam also hit a new high of nearly 800,000 tons. The cargo mix is shifting, with unit equipment tonnage well below last summer's levels when major combat units were arriving. Ammunition tonnage was down sharply from recent months as shipments on the "push" system are eliminated, and may reflect some diversion of air ordnance to Thailand to support the B-52s. The largest segment of the SVN tonnages is in "other\* cargo This category will continue to grow as the in-country troop population increas and the resupply and replacement demands rise.

Unbooked cargo remained in March at extremely low levels (29,000 tons), well below the optimum 100,000 ton level.

MSTS OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA A/

		A	AIT, OTHER SEA DESTINATION					
MONTH	Unit Equip	Ammo	Aircraft .	Other	Tota3	Jan '67 Forecast	Total.	Fore est
1965					488		128	-
Aug	. 211	23	83 4	171	400 407	Į	163	
Sep	130	44	4	229		ļ	243	
Oct	فراد	108	24 47	248	50 <del>9</del>		316	
Nov	11.7	50	47	209	353 284		308	
Dec	<u>ک</u> رَ	13	13	230	204		300	•
1966					ali e		284	
Jan	19	51 35 86	16	260	346		262	}
Feb	21	35	10	402	468		339	usen - I dije absumred Mekerin
Mar	. <mark>28</mark>	86	25 6	376	515 533		352	
Apr	7	76 46	6	424	513		363	diversity of the second
May	57	46	20	39 <sup>8</sup>	521 560		347 ·	- 2
June	43	92 84	21	40)	560		393	2 2
July	87	84	42	419	632		520	8
Aug	115	88	14	476	693		439	
Sep	210	83	17 18	412 518	722 765		485	
Oct	139	90	10	491	707		416	
Nov	150	94	2 8	514	741		362	
Dec	94	125	O	214	(-T		302	
1967	_				<b>aro</b>	er). c	382	<b>37</b> %
Jan	67 78	93 93 68	29	<b>570</b> 595	759 776	745	384	374 376 380 375
Feb	78	93	10	797		753 763	493	380
Mar	91	68	25	613	79?	770	473	375
Apr						£10		375
May	•					<b>7</b> 90		375
June						810		375 381
July						825		377
Aug						825		377
Sep			•			835 853	-	377 377 376 376 376 376
0ct						350	1	376
Nov					*	870	1	376
Dec						010	1	4, 3


a/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MTMTS adjusted to include Air Fore SASM. Forecast data from OASD(I&L).

	5			••••
ALL OTHER 3	Jan 767	GRAND TO	Jan '67	UNBCOKED CARGO CONUS
Total	Forecast	Actual	Forecast	TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS
128 163 243 316 308		616 570 752 669 592		
284 262 339 352 363 347 393 520 439 485 416 362	Annual community of the con-	630 730 854 865 884 907 1025 1212 1161 1250 1123 1103		16 45 16 84 235 213 234 298 162 66 63 87
382 384 493	374 376 380 375 375 375 381 377 377 376 376	1141 1160 1289	1119 1129 1143 1145 1159 1171 1191 1202 1212 1229 1226 1246	133 23 29
adjusted to in	iclude Air Force S	' Special Expre	ss ammo shipment	s data furnished by
	•			(ASD/SA/SEA Prog April 15,
			CONFIDEN	
	128 163 243 316 308 284 262 339 352 363 347 393 520 439 485 416 362 382 384 493	Total   Forecast	Total   Forecast   Actual	ALL OTHER SEA DESTINATIONS   Jan '67     Total   Forecast   Antual   Forecast     128

(ASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. April 15, 1967

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SHIP FLOW (TURNAROUND TIME) IN SVN



As the chart above and the attached Table show, the average number of days spent by ships in SVN and SEA holding ports continued to decrease. The March average of 12.9 days was the lowest since April 1966 (11.7 days) and was 3.2 days lower than a year ago. At the end of March no ships were in SEA holding ports, the first time this has been true in a year.

A new high was achieved in the number of ships completed when 151 ships departed SVN in March. The previous high was 139 in January. The March total was 65% above March of last year and more than double the average number of ships handled during the second half of 1965.

The number of ships in SVN ports at the end of March was 48, three less than the current MACV prescribed optimum of 51 ships working. This optimum is computed on the basis of port capability and the ship flow necessary to maintain maximum cargo discharge rates. Under-utilization of some ports and over-commitment of others can be expected because of cargo generation patterns and port operation experience to date.

#### MSTS DEEP DEAFT CARGO SHIP FLOW THROUGH SVN

	1065						3066			•		JON
	1965 <u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	1966 <u>Jan</u>	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	<u>Jan</u>
No. of ship arriving in JN		78	87	86	77	60	87	63	92	106	91	105
No. of ships departing in SVN	36	57	72	72	70	62	107	76	92	94	88	<b>9</b> 6
No. of ships in SVN at E.C.M.	16	37	52	66	73	. 71	51	38	38	50	53	<b>52</b>
No. of ships in SEA Holding Ports at E.O.M.			2		21.	21	2			2	12	12

1/ Data derived from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Excludes Air Force Special Express Ammo ships and float

	analysis	OF TIME	SPENT BY	MSTS	CARGO	SHIPS IN	SVN AND	HOLDIK	3 AREAS	<u>1</u> /	•	
	1969 Jul		Sep	<u>Oct</u>	<u>voľ</u>	<u>Dec</u>	1966 Jan	<u>Feb</u>	Mar	Apr	Fiet	<u>in</u>
No. of ships	<u>36</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>72</u>	72	70	<u>62</u>	107	<u>76</u>	<u> 22</u>	<u>94</u>	88	<u>6</u>
Avg No. of day in SVN 2/	s 8.6	5 10.6	12.8	18.6	21.2	29.1	30.5	20	14.6	11.7	14.7	1: 9
Avg No. of day in SEA Holdin Ports				2		2.2	4.9	<u>7.3</u>	1.3		8	12
Total Avg No. days	of 8.6	5 10.6	12.8	18.8	21.9	31.3	35.4	27.3	16.1	11.7	15.5	J. 5

<sup>1/</sup> Data from MSTS RVN Sealift Digest. Based on ships departing during month. Excludes Air Force Special Specia

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<sup>2/</sup> Includes unloading/loading time, time holding in SVN, sailing time between SVN ports.

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43			1
	Pen-	43 004 4 4	
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TUN	FIUC	NTIA	•

<b>-</b> -			1	. i ' i	* ****							
Mar	<u>Apr</u>	May	Jin.	Jul	Aug	Sep	<u>Oct</u>	Nov	Dec	1967 Jan	<u>Feb</u>	Mar
92	106	. 9 <u>1</u>	105	98	113	98	148	99	139	125	127	142
92	94 -	88	<b>9</b> 6	104	106	109	115	113	132	<b>139</b>	128	151
38	50	53	<b>8</b> 2	56	63	52	85	65	<b>72</b> :	<del>5</del> 8	57	48
	ā	12	12	12	. 3	11	3	9	8	7	6	0 -

Express Amo ships and Ploating storage ships.

#### l/ Dig. Areas

<u>Ker</u>	Apr	May	<u>. 17</u>	<u>Ju).</u>	Aug	Sep	<u>Oct</u>	Nov	Dec	1967 Jan	Feb	Mar
			1						132			
14.8	11.7	14.7	1! 9	16.8	14.7	15.6	15.1	50.5	17.0	16.6	14.2	11.9
k, ar	-		7 5	*					2.0			
16.1	11.7	15.5	1.2	19.6	17.6	18.6	17.2	22.2	19.0	18.5	-5.9	12.9

month. Excludes Air Forcispecial Express Ammo ships and floating

etween SVN ports.

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OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. April 13, 1967

#### CCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The attached table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to April, 1967, and presents the CASD(I&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

Total shipments from CONUS to SEA in April remained at the same high level as in March. However, shipments to SVN increased by 10% to establish an all-time high of 876,000 M/T. Within the SVN total, increases occurred in the ammunition and "other" categories. 1/ In view of the steady growth in the "other" category and other indicators, it appears that excessive stocks of material may be building-up in SVN.

Total shipments to the non-SVN ports in SEA totaled 409,000 M/T which was a 84,000 M/T reduction from the March Level. Detailed information as to the distribution among the ports is not yet available; however, preliminary information indicates the majority of the reduction may have occurred in shipments to Okinawa. If the final data confirms this, it will be a significant reversal of the March, 1967 experience commented on in last month's Southeast Asia Analysis Report (pp. 47).

In view of the Secretary of Defense decision in December, 1966 to restrict the role of Okinawa in the Army's PACOM logistic system, continued reductions in the tonnage shipped to Okinawa for the 2nd Logistic Command depot should be expected. Information available indicates the following requisition cancellation request actions by the 2nd Logistic Command.

Date of Cancellation Request	No of Line Items	\$ Value
March 8, 1967	70,000	192,700,000
March 30, 1967	4,60G	11,600,000
March 31, 1967	17,000	34,000,000
	91,600	238,300,000

If a significant portion of these cancellation requests are acted upon before shipment from CONUS, major savings in packing, in-land transportation, ocean shipping and replacement procurement costs should result.

<sup>1/ &</sup>quot;Other" includes all material except unit equipment, ammunition and aircract.

MSTS OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM COMUS TO SEA 8/

		. A	ll south viet	HAM PORTS		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ALL OF	ER SEA DESTURATION
MONTH	Unit Equip	·Amo	Aircraft	Other	Total	Jan '67 Forecast	Total	Jen 57 Porecest
1965 Ang Sep Oct Mov Dec	211 130 129 47 28	23 44 108 50 13	83 4 24 47 13	171 229 248 209 230	488 407 509 353 284		126 163 304	
1966 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Mov Dec	19 21 28 7 37 43 87 115 210 139 120	51 35 86 76 98 88 99 125	16 10 25 6 20 21 42 14 17 18 2	260 402 376 424 398 404 419 476 412 518 491	346 468 515 513 521 560 632 693 722 765 707 741		284 264 333 363 347 393 520 439 416 362	
1967 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Mov Dec	67 78 91 86	93 93 68 113	29 10 25 16	570 595 613 661	759 776 797 876	745 753 763 770 784 796 810 825 835 853 850 870	382 384 493 409	374 376 380 375 375 375 381 377 376 376

s/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MINTS edjusted to include Air Porce

Decreased as the same of the same of the same services.

	417 20602	STA DESTIBATIONS	GRAND_TO	CUNFIDENT	<b>IAL</b>
G7 Cast	200	Jen '67	Actual	Jan '57 Forecast	UNBOOKED CARGO CORUS TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS
COSE	Total	Forecast	Accust	FORECASE	TO RED DEAL DESTINATIONS
	14 14 14 13 13 13		616 570 752 669 592		
	280 260 333 357 367 393 485 116 362		630 730 854 865 884 907 1025 1213 1161 1250 1123 1103		16 45 16 84 235 213 234 298 162 66 63 87
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1	382 384 493 409	314 316 380 315 315 315 381 311 316 316	1141 1160 1289 1285	1119 1129 1143 1145 1159 1171 1191 1202 1212 1229 1226 1246	133 23 29 22

MANS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express amo shipments data furnished by

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. New 15, 1967

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#### SAIGON PORT

As the table and attached charts indicate, the ALD-Commercial Margo sector of the Saigon port is in its best condition in a year. Despite the highest rate of cargo arrivals in the port since October, 1966, the April discharge of 296,000 short tons resulted in the lowest end-of-month backlog of undischarged cargo experienced to date. The backlog on April 30, 1967 was equal to only I week's work.

## SAIGON PORT COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO INPUT - OUTPUT ANALYSIS (000 Short Tons)

	Month	Beginning Backlog	Arrivals during month 1/	Total Avail. Cargo	Discharged	Ending Backlog
1966	May*	101	264	265	179	86
	Jun	86	235	<b>321</b> .	198	123
	Jul	123	293	416	235	181
	Aug	181	264	445	249	196
	Sep	196	157	353	191	162
	Oct	162	275	437 -	215	222
	Nev	222	231	453	244	209
	Dec	209	204	413	102	311
1967	Jan	311	220	531	267	264
	Feb	264	106	370	199	171
	Mar	171	211	382	284	98
	Apr	98	260	358	296	62

Arrivals are computed rather than reported.
\* No backlog data available prior April, 1966.


The over-all progress in the port is due to the cumulative effects of improvements in facilities, equipment and management; however, as the following table indicates, U.S. military cargo handling has made a major contribution. While GVN discharge rates have remained relatively constant (excluding the low performance in December, 1966 due to the strike and February, 1967 due to TEI), the U.S. military is handling about one-third of the cargo discharged (in addition to 200,000 S/T a month of U.S. military carge).

## SAIGON PORT COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO DISCHARGED BY GVN AND U.S. MILITARY (000 Short Tons)


	Month	Discharged by GVN	Discharg- by U.S. Mil	Total Discharged	% Discharged by U. S. Mil
1966	Jul*	210	25	235	11
	Aug	222	27	249	11
	Sep	143	48	191	25
	0ct	164	51	215	24
	Nov	191	53	244	22
	Dec	66	36	102	35
1967	Jan	194	73	267	27
	Yeb	134	65	199	33
	Mar	189	95	284	34
	Apr	204	92	296	31

<sup>\*</sup> U.S. military began discharging AID cargo in July, 1956.


## SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG




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## SAIGON BARGE REPORT (COMMERCIAL ONLY)



- ( \* ) DATA NOT AVAILABLE
- (\*\*) REPORTING PERIOD CHANGED TO 10 DAY PERIODS



#### AIR CARGO SHIPMENTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following table illustrates the sharp increase in air cargo shipments from CONUS to Southeast Asia.

Air Cargo Shipments from CONUS to SVN and Other Southeast Asia 1/ (Short Tons)

Monthly Average					
<u> </u>	SVN	Other SEA	Total SEA		
Oct-Dec, 1965	4,200	5,500	19,700		
Jan-Mar, 1966	5,600	6,000	11,600		
Apr-Jun, 1966	8,100	6,600	14,700		
Jul-Sep, 1966	10,400	7,300	17,700		
Oct-Dec, 1966	14,600	8,700	23,300		
Jan-Mar, 1967	17,300	10,600	. 27,900		

1/ Data source: OASD(I&L). Other SEA defined to include Thailand, Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and Guam.

ASD(I6L) recently instituted a mandatory pre-shipping challenge procedure for all shipments of certain commodities exceeding 1,000 pounds. This action resulted from the continued growth of air shipments to Southeast Asia, an OSD sample of air export cargo which indicated questionable priority assignments, and expenditures for commercial augmentation of MAC reaching the rate of \$600 million a year. The commodity groups placed under the mandatory procedure include:

- (a) construction materials
- (b) fuels, lubricants and gas generators
- (c) printed forms
- (d) clothing
- (e) rations
- (f) office supplies

Under the procedure, detailed lists will be submitted to ASD(I&L) and the Services each month identifying all shipments made by air after challenge because of reaffirmation of the requirement for air shipment.

In a parallel action, ASD(I&L) also directed an embargo on low priority shipments in the ocean cargo system called Sea Express (SEA-EX). This will restore the SEA-EX system to its intended use of providing expedited ocean transcription for high priority cargo. The effect of the two sets of actions should be significantly reduced air and Sea Express shipments and costs.

As a direct result of the ASD(I&L) actions, CINCPAC has instituted similar procedures for intra-PACON air and expedited ocean shipments. CINCPAC also reemphasized that control must be exercised on requisitions prevent abuses of the priority system.

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June 1967

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#### POL SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SYN

As the table shows, the consumption of POL in SVN has increased sharply since the introduction of U. S. forces in 1965.

Monthly Average Military POL Consumption

(OCO Ebls)					
<u>Qtr</u>	JP-4	AvGas	MoGas	Diesel	Total
Sep 1965	398	178	120	92	788
Oct-Dec 1965	569	190	150	122	1,031
Jan-Mar 1966	855	217	184	171	1,427
Apr-Jun 1966	915	203	203	223	1,545
Jul-Sep 1966	1,188	200	255	294	1,937
Oct-Dec 1966	1,325	228	335	454	2,342
Jan-Mar 1967	1,521.	540	366	498	2,625
Apr 1967	1,473	237	449	606	2,765
Level Off			•		
Sep 1967(Est.)	1;750	275	385	603	3,013

The current military POL requirements for the entire Pacific Command (PACOM) are approximately 13.9 million barrels a month. The sources of supply for these requirements have been:

Product ·	Western Hemisphere (000 Bbls)	Middle East (OOO Bbls)	Total (000 Bbls).
JP-4	4,100	2,100	6,200
JP-5*	700	2,100	700
MoGas	. 200	500	700
Diesel	500	1,100	1,600
AvGas	800	100	900
Navy Special			
Oil	<u>1,100</u>	<u>2,790</u>	<u>3,800</u>
TOTA	AL 7,400	6,500	13,900

<sup>\*</sup> JP-5 is used in Navy carrier-based aircraft.

At the beginning of the Middle East crisis in early June, total PACOM operating stocks and reserves were estimated to be capable of supporting operations at current consumption rates (assuming no interruptions of normal Western Hemisphere inputs) for the following periods:

Product	Days of Supply
JP-14	70
MoGas	100
Diesel	60
Navy Special	75
AvGas and JP-5	*

<sup>\*</sup> Infinite since JP-5 and essentially all AvGas supplied from Western Hemisphere.

Actions have been taken to procure product from Western Hemisphere sources and MSTS is spot chartering tankers to avoid major drawdowns of reserve stocks. Since a shift to the Western Hemisphere requires an additional 15 days steaming time to Western Pacific destinations, approximately 35 extra T-5 (200,000 Bbl) tankers are required to replace the Middle East deliveries.

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#### SVN PORT DEVELOPMENT AND CAPABILITY

The \$152 million construction effort has increased port capacity from the July, 1965 level of approximately 240,000 ST/month to the present 1.2 million ST/month. Additional projects which are under construction will increase capacity to 1.4 million ST/month by August, 1967, barring slippages in construction. (See attached table).

Port capacity estimates are based on facility design factors. Actual port capability depends not only on facilities but also personnel, equipment, the cargo mix and, particularly in SVN, weather conditions. Consequently, MACV estimates the peak throughput capability at 1.2 million ST to be achieved in September, 1967. This represents a 200,000 ST/month or 15% reduction. The MACV capability estimate coincides closely with the CINCPAC forecasted peak Program 4 throughput requirement of approximately 1.1 million ST in May, 1967 (actual May throughput was 1.0 million ST).

However, MACV's estimates of both design capacity and capability may be too conservative, based on actual performance to date. For example, Dunang's capability was estimated at 197,000 ST for May, 1967 despite its handling 216,000 ST in April. Danang actually handled 199,000 tons in May and could have handled more if more ships had been available to offload.

MACV's directives to shipping control agencies state that the optimum number of deep draft ships required to maximize Danang's productivity is 10 (1 at each of the 6 berths and 4 in the stream for lighterage discharge); however, the April performance was achieved with a daily average of only 5.2 deep draft ships available for discharge. The ships at Danang on selected dates were as follows:

<u>Date</u>	No. of Ships
March 31, 1967	4
April 30, 1967	<b>5</b> .
April 20, 1967	3
April 30, 1967	2

Overall the 13 SVN ports performed in accordance with forecasted capability and requirements in April and May, 1967. However, the following number of ports reported low performance due to insufficient cargo being available for discharge:

Denout Denied	No. of Ports with
Report Period	Idle Capacity
1-10 April 1967	2
11-20 April 1967	4
21-30 April 1967	6
1-10 May 1967	4
11-20 May 1967	3
21-31 May 1967	1 .

The data indicates that improved capacity and capability estimates, together with improved ship scheduling (to minimize peaks and valleys in SVN port workload), would permit the required tonnages to be handled with fewer resources. The healthy stock levels now in place in SVN should permit the improved ship scheduling.

#### SVN MILITARY PORT DEVELOPMENT STATUS SUMMARY 1/

	NO. OF	DEEP DRAI	T BERTHS		TAL CAPACITY (ST/mo.)	2/
	Jul 1965	Apr 1967	Total <u>Planned</u>	Jul 1965 3/	Apr 1967	Total Planned
Cam Ranh Bay	1	9	10	39,000	183,000	258,000
*Chu Lai				7,500	60,000	72,000
Da Nang		6	6	15,000	315,000	315,000
*Dong Tam					9,000	24,000
*Hue-Phu Bai/ Tan My/Dong H Cua Viet/Dam					27,000	51,000
*Nha Trang	<b>V</b>		•	15,000	33,000	33,000
*Phan Rang	•				27,000	42,000
atten wend				:	27,000	42,000
Qui Nhon		4	6	39,000	135,000	213,000
Saigon .4/	. 5	7	7	120,000	309,000	309,000
Tuy Hoa/Vung	Ro .	2	2		69,000	69,000
Vung Tau	6	<u>1</u> 29 .	<del>2</del> 33	4,500 240,000	33,000 1,200,000	52,000 1,437,000

Shallow draft and/or lighterage ports.

June 15, 1967

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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<sup>1/</sup> Data from CINCPAC SVN port development plan dtd Apr 11, 1967.
2/ Includes deep draft berths, shallow draft and lighterage discharge.
3/ Estimated.
4/ Saigon berth data includes only those used by U.S. military; assumes return of 2 berths to GVN use when last two berths at Newport are completed.

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#### OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM COMUS TO SEA

The attached table summarizes the coean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to June, 1967 and presents the latest OASD(I&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

Total shipments from CCNUS to South Vietnam in June resulted in the first significant month-to-month decline which has occured since December, 1965. The June total of 796,000 M/T was 79,000 M/T or 9% below May and 59,000 M/T or 7% below forecast. The major decrease (96,000 M/T) occurred in the "Other" category. While I month's experience does not establish a trend, a reversal of the steady growth of this category should be expected as a result of the levelling-off of new unit deployments, the larger stocks on hand in-country and a general shift into the resupply phase of logistic operations. Efforts are underway in OASD(I&L) to examine the commodity groupings in the "Other" category to determine commodity trends. The data may be useful to appraise whether the shift from initial stock build-up to resupply is being accomplished in a timely enough manner.

Total shipments to the non-SVN SEA destinations also declined from the May level. While complete data for all destinations is not yet available, the June preliminary data confirms that the heavy input trend to Okinawa has been reversed. (April, Southeast Asia Analysis Report, pg. 47). Pertinent statistics are:

Ccean	Shipments	from	CONUS	to	Okinawa

(000)	M/T)
Month	Total
1967 Jan.	66.2
Feb.	107.6
Mar.	164.1
Apr.	116.5
May	92.6
June	87.5 (P)

It should be of interest to the Logistic Community that while between August, 1965 and June, 1967 ocean shipments from CONUS to SVN increased by only 63%, shipments to all other SEA destinations increased by 200%. When this fact is considered together with the monthly input of an average of 170,000 M/T into SVN from non-U.S. ports, it suggests there may be a considerable amount of unnecessary inventory build-up, transshipments and double-handling of cargo for SVN by the off-shore bases.

1/ "Other" includes all material except unit equipment, ammunition and aircraft.

# MSTS OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA 8/

			LL SOUTH VIET	NAM PURTS		May '67	ALL OTHER
HTTON	Unit Equip	Ammo	Aircraft	Other	Total	Forecast	Total
1965					•	1.	
Aug	211	23	8 <u>3</u>	171	488	1.	128
Sep	130	23 44	Ī,	229 248	407	ľ	163
Oct	129	108	24	248	509		243
Nov	47	50	47	209	353	1	31 <u>6</u> 308
Dec	28	13	13	230	284	· · ·	308
1966				•			
Jan	19 21	51	16	<b>26</b> 0	346	1	564
<b>Feb</b>	21	51 35 86	10	402	468		262 339 332 363 347 393 520
Mar	28	86	25	376	515		339
Apr	7	76	, <b>6</b>	424	513		352
May	57 43	46.	20	398	, 521	1	363
June	43	92	57	404	560	t	347
July	87	92 84 88	42	419	632 693	1	<b>39</b> 3
Aug	115	88	14	476	693	•	520
Sep	210	83	17 18	412	722		439
Oct	139	90	18	518	<b>?</b> 65		485
Nov	120	94	2 8	491 514	707	ļ	436
Dec	<b>9</b> #	125	8	514	741		362
1967	_					9	_
Jan	67 78	93	<b>10</b> 59	<b>570</b> 595	759 776	ļ.	382 384
Feb		93 93		595		ļ	354
Mar	91 <b>8</b> 6	68	25 16	613 661	797	1	493 409 401. 3 <b>6</b> 4
Apr		113	16	661	876 875		<b>+09</b>
May	37	132	29 26	677	875	821	401
June	69	120	26	581	796	855 860	364
July	-					860	
Aug						872 866	
Sep						866	
Oct						901 873	
Kov						873	
Dec						891	

a/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MTMTS adjusted to include SASM. Forecast data from CASD(T&L).

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F.	t	ALL OTHER	SEA DESTINATIONS	GRAND T	OTAL SEA	i
ī	May '67 Forecast	Total	May '67 Forecast	Actual	May '67 Forecast	UNBOOKED CARGO CONUS TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS
S. C.		128 163 243 316 308		616 570 752 669 592	-	·
685310232571.		284 262 339 352 363 347 393 520 439 485 416 362		630 730 854 865 884 907 1025 1213 1161 1250 1123 1103		16 45 16 34 235 213 234 298 352 66 63 87
96.765K	821 855 860 872 866 901 873 891	362 364 493 409 401 364	408 408 405 410 405 405 405	1141 1160 1289 1285 1276 1180	1,229 1,263 1,265 1,282 1,271 1,306 1,278 1,296	133 23 29 22 33 24

data from MIMIS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express same shipments data furnished by

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. July 1, 1967

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July 1967

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#### SAIGON PORT

As the table and attached charts indicate, the Saigon port has maintained the excellent condition reported in the May Southeast Asia Analysis Report (p46-49). The end-of-the month backlogs in May and June were the lowest experienced to date. This performance was achieved despite heavy arrivals of cargo. The end of June backlog was equal to only one week's work.

# SAIGON PORT COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO INPUT - OUTPUT ANALYSIS (000 Short Tons)

	Month	Beginning Backlog	Arrivals during	Total Avail.	Discharged	Ending Backlog
1966	May* Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec	101 86 123 181 196 162 222 209	164 235 293 264 157 275 231 204	265 321 416 445 353 437 453 413	179 198 235 249 191 215 244 102	86 123 181 196 162 222 209 311
1967	Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun	311 264 171 98 62 60	220 106 211 260 256 237	531 370 382 358 318 297	267 199 284 296 258 237	264 171 98 62 60 60

<sup>1/</sup> Arrivals are computed rather than reported.

\* Data not available for April, 1966 and prior months.

A particularly favorable development is the sharply improved status of the barge fleet. As the attached Saigon Barge Report chart indicates, at the end of June only 94 barges still had cargo on board and of these, only 9 had cargo aboard longer than 30 days. In contrast, on March 20, 1967, there were 979 loaded barges and of these 642 had cargo aboard longer than 30 days. The improved facilities and management of the port have made this significant progress possible.

A less favorable aspect is the increase in the percentage of the cargo being discharged by the U. S. military instead of by the GVN. As the following table shows, while the U. S. production was the highest to date, the GVN production was the lowest since February 1967. The U. S. is now discharging 45% of the AID/Commercial cargo in the Saigon port. Perhaps it is now timely to reappraise the continued need for such large-scale U.S. assistance.


<u>的过去式和时间的时候是是不是有的,这个人的,你们也不是一个人,也是是是是一个人的,也是是一个人的,他们也是是一个人的,他们也是是一个人的,他们也是一个人的人的,他们也是一个人的人的人,他们也是一个人的人的人,他们也是一个人的人们也是一个人的人们也是一个人的人们也是一个人的人们的人们也是一个人的人们也是一个人的人们也是一个人的人们也是一个人的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们们的一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是一个人们的人们也是</u>

# SAIGON PORT COMMERCIAL/AID CARGO DISCHARGED BY GVN AND U.S. MILITARY (000 Short Tons)

	Month	Discharged	Discharged	Total	% Discharged
	Month	by GVN	by U.S. Mil	<u>Discharged</u>	by U.S. Mil
1966	Jul*	210	25	235	11.
	Aug	222	27	249	11
	Sép	143	48	191	25
	Oct	164	<b>51</b>	215	24
	Nov	191	53	244	22
	Dec	66	36	102	35
1967	Jan	194	73	267	27
	Feb	134	65	199	33
	Mar	189	95	284	34
	Apr	204	92	296	31
	May	165	93	258	36
	Jun	131	106	237	45

<sup>\*</sup> U.S. military began discharging AID cargo in July, 1966.

### SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG



# GVN BACKLOG FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE


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GVN COMM'L/AID CARGO BACKLOG

CPA/CIP AID CARGO U.S. MIL BACKLOG

U.S. MIL. CARGO BACKLOG




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#### **SAIGON BARGE REPORT**

(COMMERCIAL ONLY)




**JANUARY** 

**FEBRUARY** 

(\*) DATA NOT AVAILABLE

DECEMBER

(\*\*) REPORTING PERIOD CHANGED TO 10 DAY PERIODS



PERIODS

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#### OCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA

The attached table summarizes the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August, 1965 to July, 1967 and presents the latest OAS (I&L) forecast of shipments through December, 1967.

In July shipments from CONUS to South Vietnam continued estimated in June level and totaled 783,000 M/T. However, suipments from CONUS to the nor-SVN SEA destinations increased by 84,000 M/T to a total of 468,000 M/T. Thus, of the 1.3 million M/T shipped to SEA, shipments to the non-SVN destinations were 37%. In contrast, U.S. military forces in other than SVN (excluding dependents) are only 26% of the total U.S. military population in SFA. Considering the higher tempo of operations and accelerated rates of consumption in SVN, the continued heavy influx into the non-SVN ports appears high.

The following table compares shipments to the non-SVN ports for the 2nd quarter CY 1967 and July 1967 on a port-by-port basis:

# SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO NON-SVN SEA PORTS 1/

	2nd Qtr CY 1967 Mo. Ave.	July 1967	Net Change
Thailand	75.5	73.8	(1.7)
Taiwan	11.7	16.4	4.7
Philippines .	57,2	51 <b>.</b> 6	(5.6)
Japan	74.5	83.2	8.7
Korea	71.6	110.5	38.9
Guam	38.5	33.1	(5.4)
Okinawa	87.7	98.9	11.2

<sup>1/</sup> Data from MSTS, July data preliminary.

With the exception of Korea, which increased by 54%, the changes were relatively minor. As there are no known factors which account for the sharp increase in shipments to Korea, OASD (I&L) is asking the Department of Army to investigate.

July was the sixth consecutive month in which the unbooked cargo backlog was less than the optimum 100,000 M/T level. During the month there were several instances of insufficient cargo generation which resulted in idle MSTS ships in CONUS ports. The Secretary of Defense has approved a Navy recommendation that 16 GAA ships should be inactivated and returned to the NDRF. OASD(T&L) is studying the possibility of further inactivations. The excess ship capability, despite continued high lift requirements, results from the improved ship turnaround times in SVN and the employment of a more efficient mix of ships such as the container ships, which have been serving the Philippines and Okinawa and in July began service to SVN.

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# MSTS CCEAN CARGO SHIPMENTS FROM CONUS TO SEA 8/

	<del></del>	A	LL SOUTH VIET	NAM PORTE		May 67	ALL OTHER	
Month	Unit Equip	Ammo	Aircraft	Other	Total	Forecast	Total	P
1965								1
Aug	211	23	£3	171	488		128	į
Sep	130	44	Ĭ,	559	407	1	153	į
Oct	129	108	24	248	509		, 243	1
Nov.	47	50	47	209	353		316	į
Dec	28	13	13	230	353 284		316 308	1
1966				•				į
Jan	19	51	16	260	346		264	1
Feb	21.	35	10	402	468		262	1
Mar	28	86	25	376	515		339	4
Apr	7	51 35 86 76 46	6	484	513		352	Ì
May	57	46	20	398	521	`	363	ĺ
J/me	μż	92	21	404	560	į	347	
July	43 87	92 84	<b>45</b>	419	632		393	
Aug	115	88	14	476	693	Ĭ	520	:
Sep	510	83	17	412	722	. [	439	
Cet	1.39	90	18	518	765	l	485	
Nov	120	94		491	707	•	416	
Dec	94	125	2 8	514	741	J	362	
1967								
Jan	67 78	93	29	570	759	1	382	
Feb	78	93 93	10 29	<b>570</b> 595	759 776		<b>382</b> 384	
Har	91 86	68		613	797	1	493	
Apr	86	113	25 16	613 661	876		493 409	4
May	37	132	29	677	876 875	821	401	:
June	69	120	26	58 <u>1</u>	79€	855	384	
July	69 43	114	31	595	79€ 783	860	384 468	2
Aug	•		-		•	855 860 872 866		:
Sep						866		
0ct						901		
Nov						873		:
Dec						891		;

s/ SEA defined to include all ports west of Hawaii. Actual data from MIMIS adjusted to include SASM. Forecast data from OASD(IZL).

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	<del> }</del>	ALL OTHER	SEA DESTINATIONS	GRAND T	OTAL SEA	
ı	May '67 Forecast	Total	May '67 Forecast	Actual	May 167 Forecast	UNBOOKED CARGO CONUS TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS
87934		128 163 243 316 308		616 570 752 669 592		
685310232571		284 262 339 352 363 347 393 520 439 416 362		630 730 854 865 884 907 1025 1213 1161 1250 1123 1103		16 45 16 84 235 213 234 298 162 66 63 87
76763	821 855 860 872 866 901 873 891	382 384 493 409 491 384 468	408 408 405 410 405 405 405	1141 1160 1289 1285 1276 1180 1251	1,229 1,263 1,265 1,282 1,271 1,306 1,278	133 23 29 22 33 24 25

data from MIMIS adjusted to include Air Force Special Express ammo shipments data furnished by

OASD/SA/SEA Programs Div. August 14: 1967

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#### CARGO SEALITT FROM COMUS TO SVN

The following table shows DOD dry cargo sealift movements to Vietnam from July 1965 to the present, both in rotal and by type of ship.

		<u>Dr</u>	y Cargo Mov (COO M/T)	<u>eā</u> &/	
FY 1966	Nucleus	GAA	Ccerter	Berth Term	Total
1st Qtr	378	124	663	69	1,23 <sup>1</sup> ,
2nd Qtr	343	339	524	12	1,218
3rd Qtr	388	478	724	-	1,590
4th Qtr	462	661	854	279	2,296
Total	1,571	1,602	2,805	360	6,338
FY 1967  1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Total	601	729	980	25	2,335
	563	786	1,069	154	2,572
	590	906	1,179	134	2,809
	671	<u>1,092</u>	1,292	53	3,108
	2,425	3,513	4,520	366	10,824
FY 1968  1st Qtr 2nd Qtr* Total	646	923	1,151	83	2,803
	<u>613</u>	924	1,176	<u>58</u>	2,771
	1,259	1,847	2,327	141	5,574

#### \*Estimated

a/ Includes reefer, aircraft, amminition, general and AID cargo moved by MSTS controlled ships.

It appears that the peak tonnages occurred in the 4th quarter FY67. Despite the Program #5 force level increases, it is unlikely that the 4th quarter total will be exceeded since stock levels are in place, the heavy influx of construction material is over and improved in-country supply management procedures should result in letter utilization of stocks on hand.

The data point up the vital role of the GAA (General Agency Agreement) ships reactivated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet which carried approximately one-third of the total cargo in FY67. The initial request for GAA ships was approved in July 1965 and by March 1967 there were 166 operating as part of the MSTS controlled fleet. In view of the leveling off of shipping requirements and improved ship turnaround times in SVN ports, it was clear that excess shipping capability would exist in FY68. Thus, the Navy was authorized to deactivate and return 15 GAA ships to the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Of the remaining 151 ships, 139 are in full operating status and 12 are in a reduced operating status, available to meet unexpected surge requirements for SVN or elsewhere.

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#### EFFECTS OF TET OFFENSIVE ON SVN PORT OPERATIONS

The impact of the Tet Offensive on SVN port operations was confined almost entirely to the Saigon port. The following Table displays the data available at the time this publication went to press.

TABLE 1
Saigon Port Deep Draft Shipping Status

	Ships with Mil. Cargo			Ships	with AII	)/Comm'l	Cargo	
	Working	Waiting	In Hold	Total	Working	Waiting	In Hold	Total
1/20/68	12	3	5	17	17	1		18
1/31/68	13	4	3	20	19			19
2/10/68 2/20/68 (1	16	5	7	28	22	13		35
2/20/68 (1	P) 14	11	13	38		Data	not avai	lable.

a/ Includes Cat Lai ammunition discharge site.

Being heavily dependent upon civilian stevedores and truck drivers, the Saigon port's resumption of work was severely hampered by the curfew which reduced the workday from two shifts of ten hours to less than one full shift. This, coupled with port clearance delays, accounted for the rapid build-up of shipping in the port.

Information available on February 20th indicated the military port's preduction was back to normal and, barring further interruptions, the number of ships would be reduced to normal levels within approximately 3 - 4 weeks. In view of the number of ships with military cargo in transit to Saigon (46 ships to arrive during the balance of February or in March), MACV has taken the following actions:

- a. Limited CONUS outloadings for Saigon (less ammunition) to 30,000 M/T per week. This is a 30% reduction.
- b. Curtailed backloading at Saigon except for RO/RO and containerships.
- c. Diverted some ships with Saigon cargo to other SVN ports for discharge.

#### MILITARY CARGO WORKLOAD IN SVN

The following table compares the military cargo workload of the ports in I CTZ with all other SVN ports over the past 13 months.

# MILITARY CARGO FORT WORKLOAD IN SVN (000 Short Tons)

Month	Dong Ha	Hue	Danang	Chu Lai	Total I CTZ	All Other SVN Ports	Total SVN	I CTZ % of Total
1967 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec	7:7 20.1 19.3 26.0 21.9 24.5 21.7 31.8 39.7 33.9	4.5 11.7 9.4 13.5 19.2 18.6 18.4 20.0 15.9 12.0 19.4 15.8 23.9	139.8 141.2 157.0 215.7 198.7 228.2 209.1 232.7 211.8 197.7 236.5 211.7	36.0 37.0 37.0 37.0 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4	181.1 197.6 221.5 310.9 294.3 326.7 298.6 331.5 299.2 286.9 344.7 312.9 419.9	632.3 678.4 688.0 708.4 728.8 730.2 683.1 699.0 647.4 633.3 742.2 786.1	813.4 876.0 909.5 1019.3 1023.1 1056.9 981.7 1030.5 946.6 920.2 1086.9 1099.0 1230.0	22.3 22.6 24.4 30.5 28.8 30.9 30.4 32.2 31.6 31.7 28.5 34.1

a/ Total workload is the sum of cargo discharged and cargo outloaded.

The most significant fact indicated by the data is that while the workload of all other SVN ports increased only 28% between January 1967 and January 1968 the workload in the I CTZ increased nearly 132%. This is a reflection of not only the steadily increasing troop strength in the I CTZ but also the primary reliance on sealines of communications for intra-corps resupply. Danang, the only deep draft port in the I CTZ and thus the site of the major Navy and Marine supply and maintenance facilities, is the logistic hub. All cargo arriving in the I CTZ aboard deep draft ships must be unloaded at Danang and if required elsewhere in I CTZ, must be transshipped either to Chu Lai for the southern sector or north to Hue or Dong Ha. The vast majority of the transshipped cargo must go by sea in shallow draft craft because of the interdicted roads and bridges.

One measure of the volume of intra-corps sea transshipments is the fact that during the past 3 months, 35% (266,000 S/T) of the 755,000 S/T of cargo handled at Danang has been cargo outloaded from the port. In contrast, outloading of cargo at all other SVN ports accounted for only 22% of the total cargo handled during the same period.

When Danang's total port workload is compared only against the other three major deep draft ports in S/N, the following data results:

TABLE 2

# PRINCIPAL SVN DEEP DRAFT PORTS MILITARY CARGO WORKLOAD (OCO Short Tons)

	Month	Danang	Qui Nhon	Cam Ranh Bay	Saigona/
1967	Jan	139.8	117.1	173.8	250.8
	Feb	141.2	132.6	186.0 ·	247.3
	Mar	157.0	160.8	189.8	243.1
	Apr	215.7	155.7	169.8	276.1
	May	198.7	159.6	150.4	305.2
	Jun	228.2	166.4	176.2	272.8
	Jul	209.1	161.5	183.1	224.2
	Aug	232.7	186.2	174.2	232.6
	Sep	211.8	184.9	138.7	211.2
	Oct	197.7	135.7	149.7	237.3
	Nov	236.5	143.4	197.6	276.7
	Dec	211.7	178.2	194.9	276.9
1968	Jan	306.7	168.0	199.4	299.1

a/ Includes amounition at Cat Lai

The data indicates that Danang is now the major U.S. military port in SVM. Its vital importance for support of the augmented forces in the I CTZ is obvious. Even a temporary loss of Danang's integrated logistical capabilities, either through enemy action or natural phenomena, could have grave consequences.


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#### CINCPAC FLACEDIE ITEMS

The FLAGFOIE System for designating oritical items for SEA support was discontinued as an OSD regular, but in August 1966; however, CINOPAC has retained it as a system for reporting to JCS. The following provides the current status of the six items on FLAGFOIE:

Item Ho.	Material	Comment 2
B-10	Herbicide	COMMENACY has a stated requirement for 11.9 million gallons of herbicides for defoliation during FT 68. USAF budget provides only for purchase of 6.4 million gallons for that period. Additional funding will be required. Plant expansion will be nacessary as well and will require 12-18 months leadtime. Hence, expanded production will not be available prior to 4th quarter FY 68.
E-1	Lightweight Utility Uniforms	Production continues to increase and now essentially meets the demands of all troops in SEA. However, in order to meet the requirement for issuance of 5 sets of the lightweight uniforms to all combat forces in SEA, increased production and time are required. It is expected that by July 1967, production and stocks will permit the issuance of the required 5 sets to all those requiring them.
E-5	Tropical Boots-DMS	Reports from SEA indic : that minimum requirements for all combat to ops have now been met. However, requirements for issuance of 2 pairs of boots to each individual combat man in SEA will not be met until July 1967 when production and stocks catch up with demand.
F-5	MK2 MOD1 Impulse Cartridge	Cartriage is used in conjunction with the MER/TER* bomb racks and is a vital part of the system. The cartriage which somewhat resembles a shotgun shell is used to "blow away" or eject ordnance stores (bumbs, rockets) away from the bomb rack. Heavy usage by Navy in SEA operations has created temporary shortage of this item. Supply should meet demand by end of February 1967.

1/ Source: JCS J-4
\* MER/TER - Multiple ejection rack Triple ejection rack





		<u>, 1</u> /2
Item No.	<u> Kanorial</u>	Comment
F-6	MR/TER* Aircraft Bomb Racks	Inese racks were principally made by Douglas Aircraft for the A-4 aircraft. Since the A-4 was designed essentially as a nuclear bomb carrier, provision was not originally made for the carriage of multiple loads of "iron" bombs and rockets. The racks are not a "simple" item; they are made of several complex mechanism and an electrical wiring system in association with the impulse cartridge. Supply should meet demand by November 1967.
F-7	5 Inch/38 AAC/HC Gun Ammunition	Naval gunfire support missions and "SEA Dragon" have markedly increased consumption of 5 inch gun ammunition. To meet immediate needs the Navy has converted 50,000 rounds from VT to HE-PD; production of full charges has been accelerated to provide 40,000 rounds/month; and a portion of CONUS assets were shipped to SEA. Increased production should meet demands by June 1967.**

1/ Source: JCS J-4
\* MER/TER - Multiple ejection rack/Triple ejection rack.
\*\* QASD(SA) Comment. Production is now meeting SEA consumption requirements and will fulfill FY 68 logistic guidance objectives in June of 1957.

